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I. INTRODUCTION
With the state of the Virginia economy as it is,' the law sur-
rounding fraudulent transfers has never been more relevant to
members of the Virginia Bar than at the present. There is an old
investment truism which states, "Bulls make money, bears make
money, pigs get slaughtered."2 Admittedly, this quip is more ap-
plicable to a financial maverick on Wall Street than it is to a Vir-
ginia general practitioner. Nonetheless, it hints at the very real
truth that those who are reckless with their property run the risk
of losing it. Much in the same way, an attorney who recklessly
structures a transfer of a client's property without giving due re-
* Associate, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; J.D., 2011, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, American Military University. The author specifical-
ly thanks Professor David Epstein for his invaluable guidance in forming this article and
the members of the University of Richmond Law Review for their hard work in bringing it
to fruition.
** Associate, Parrish, Houck & Snead, PLC, Fredericksburg, Virginia; J.D., 2011,
University of Richmond School of Law; B.S., 2008, University of Mary Washington.
1. A Monthly Update of the Fifth District Economy, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
RICHMOND (Fed. Reserve Bank of Rich., Richmond, V.A.), Mar. 2011, at 1 ("The Virginia
economy remained weak in recent months, with sluggish labor markets and continued
weakness in the housing sector."). Especially relevant to this essay is the fact that foreclo-
sure starts and inventory rates both rose in March of 2011. Id.
2. Foolsaurus, THE MOTLEY FOOL, http://wiki.fool.com/Bulls-makemoney,bears
make money,_pigs-get slaughtered (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
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gard to risks imposed by fraudulent transfer law could wreak dis-
astrous consequences on the client and find herself in an ethical
dilemma. Unfortunately, Virginia's body of fraudulent transfer
law is less than well-defined and acts as a legal minefield-out of
sight and capable of harming the unwary who traverse it.
Generally speaking, a fraudulent transfer can be defined as a
transfer of property which the debtor uses-intentionally or unin-
tentionally-to place the property beyond the reach of creditors.3
U.S. history shows a correlation between a faltering economy and
increases in various types of fraudulent transactions. Currently,
the economy is still recovering from the effects of a severe reces-
sion that depreciated the value of all classes of assets.5 Not sur-
prisingly, the current economic difficulties confronting the United
States are generating increased fraudulent transfer litigation in
both federal and state courts.' There are at least two reasons
have been linked to an increase in fraudulent transfer litigation
in poor economic conditions: (a) debtors are more likely to at-
tempt fraudulent conveyances; and (b) creditors are more likely to
challenge transfers as fraudulent.'
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") is the prevail-
ing body of fraudulent transfer law in the United States.' Cur-
rently, Virginia is one of eight jurisdictions that has not adopted
the Act.9 Rather, Virginia's body of fraudulent transfer law is
primarily governed by two statutes that are merely recodifica-
tions of versions that find their roots in the 1800s.1 o Although
Virginia has a body of fraudulent transfer law wholly separate
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 733 (9th ed. 2009).
4. Jonathan N. Helfat et al., Ten Assumptions That Secured Lenders Should Not
Make in 2010, SECURED LENDER, Mar. 2010, at 33. ("Every economic downturn in recent
U.S. history has generated a flurry of fraudulent transfer claims as creditors, committees,
and bankruptcy trustees of troubled companies turn to lenders and former shareholders
for redress, and the current economic crisis is no exception.").
5. William R. Culp & Christian L. Perrin, The Case for Caution: Fraudulent Convey-
ance Risks in Estate Planning, THE WILLS & THE WAY (North Carolina Bar Ass'n, Cary,
N.C.), Sept. 2010, at 25.
6. Helfat, et al., supra note 4, at 33.
7. Culp & Perrin, supra note 5, at 25.
8. As of March 3, 2011 forty-four states and the District of Columbia have enacted
the UFTA. See Legislative Fact Sheet-Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION, http://www.ncusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Fraudulent Transfer
Act (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter UFTA Legislative Fact Sheet].
9. Id.
10. See infra Part I.B.
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from the UFTA, the provisions of the UFTA are equally relevant
to Virginia practitioners for several reasons: (a) it is the law of
the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, including sev-
eral that border Virginia;" (b) federal common law is aligned with
the UFTA;12 and (c) the UFTA was specifically designed to oper-
ate in accordance with fraudulent transfer provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code.13
Virginia attorneys-particularly attorneys practicing commer-
cial law-must maintain a thorough understanding of both the
UFTA and Virginia fraudulent transfer law in order to assure
their client's interests are fully protected. This is true for several
reasons. In terms of state court litigation, creditors often rely on
fraudulent transfer laws to attempt to undo a transfer that placed
a debtor's assets beyond their reach. 4 For Virginia lawyers, this
may involve litigating under Virginia fraudulent transfer law
or-due to conflict of law principles or contractual agreement-
under the UFTA."' In terms of federal litigation, a party could use
diversity jurisdiction to litigate whether a transfer of property
may be avoided as fraudulent." In such a lawsuit, conflict of law
principles or a court exercising its discretion to make use of fed-
eral common law create possibility that either body of law could
control the outcome of the case." Additionally, the Bankruptcy
11. See UFTA Legislative Fact Sheet, supra note 8 (listing forty-five jurisdictions that
have enacted the UFTA, including West Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina).
12. Terry v. June, 359 F. Supp. 2d 510, 520 (W.D. Va. 2005).
13. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4, prefatory note (2006) (noting
that the commission's decision to draft the UFTA was influenced by the fact that recent
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code made the UFCA incompatible with that Act).
14. See Raytech Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re Raytech Corp.), 241 B.R.
790, 794 (Bankr. D. Comm. 1999) ("[T]he general purpose of fraudulent transfer law . .
is to prevent [a] debtor from taking deliberate action to hinder, delay, or defraud his credi-
tors by providing a remedy to creditors and potential creditors to undo the detrimental
effects of a fraudulent transfer.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See Terry v. June, 420 F. Supp. 2d 493 (W.D. Va. 2006) (involving a defendant op-
erating a Ponzi scheme while living in Charlottesville, Virginia whose fraudulent transfer
case was eventually adjudicated under the laws of Florida and Michigan, two states which
enacted the UFTA); see also Settlement Funding v. Von Neumann-Lillie, 274 Va. 76, 80,
645 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2007) (holding that "[i]f a contract specifies that the substantive law
of another jurisdiction governs its interpretation or application, the parties' choice of sub-
stantive law should be applied").
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
17. See GM Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Camilleri Bros. Chevrolet, 109 F. Supp. 2d 58,
60 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the fraudulent
transfer claim based on diversity).
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Code allows a trustee to avoid transfers of the debtor's property
made in violation of state fraudulent transfer law or the fraudu-
lent transfer provisions of the Code, and a significant amount of
fraudulent transfer litigation occurs in this context.18
The role of lawyers in relation to fraudulent transfers, howev-
er, is not limited to merely representing a debtor or creditor in lit-
igating the validity of a purported fraudulent transfer. Indeed,
well before any litigation occurs, both debtors and creditors call
upon lawyers to issue opinions concerning the risk that a contem-
plated transfer could subsequently be attacked as fraudulent.1 9
Debtors may rely on such opinions for purposes of estate planning
or business planning, and creditors may rely on such opinions
when determining whether to litigate the validity of a particular
transfer.2 0 To perform these services effectively, lawyers must
know both what is clear and what is unclear about the bodies of
fraudulent transfer law that could later impact any given trans-
fer.2 1 This article provides a long-overdue critical analysis of the
differences between the UFTA and Virginia's fraudulent transfer
statutes in order to alert practitioners to the unsettled areas in
both bodies of law. Part I discusses the background of the UFTA
and Virginia fraudulent transfer statutes. Part II analyzes the
UFTA provisions in comparison to their Virginia counterparts
and the UFTA provisions that have no Virginia counterparts, so
as to identify differences between the two bodies of fraudulent
transfer law. Part III presents the authors' conclusion regarding
Virginia fraudulent transfer law and considers whether creditors
would realize any additional protection if the General Assembly
were to adopt the UFTA.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2006) (enabling a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any transfer
of property that an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim could have avoided under
applicable state law); see also Alan Resnick, Finding the Shoes That Fit: How Derivative Is
the Trustee's Power to Avoid Fraudulent Conveyances Under Section 544(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 205, 206 (2009). The purpose of this section was to rec-
ognize the body of state laws addressing fraudulent transfers and allow a trustee the
choice of avoiding transfers under § 544 and the applicable state fraudulent transfer law,
or under only federal law pursuant to § 548. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 548.01[4] (Alan
N. Resnick & Henry J. Sonner eds., 15th ed. rev.).
19. See, e.g., Bankruptcy, TROUTMAN SANDERS, http://www.troutmansanders.com/ban
kruptcy/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2011); Preference & Fraudulent Transfers Litigation Defense,
AKERMAN, http://1aborlaw.com/practices/practice.asp?id=494&more=1 (last visited Oct. 12,
2011).
20. Barry A. Nelson, Surprise! You May Already Be an Asset Protection Attorney-
Take the Quiz and Find Out, 79 FLA. BAR J. 10, 10 (2005).
21. See id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
The UFTA's roots can be traced to the common law of Eng-
land.22 In 1570, England's parliament enacted the Statute of 13
Elizabeth ("Statute 13").23 Statute 13 made it unlawful for an in-
dividual to convey real or personal property with the intent to
"delay, hinder or defraud creditors."24 Following America's inde-
pendence from England, many states relied on Statute 13's con-
cept of intending to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors as the
foundation for their fraudulent transfer law. 25 Some states incor-
porated the doctrine as part of their common law tradition, while
others enacted legislation reflecting identical or similar language
to Statute 13.26
States, however, also adopted divergent approaches in applying
their own versions of Statute 13.27 This disunity formed, in part,
because of how different states allowed an individual to prove in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.2 8 Creditors rarely
proved the intent element of a fraudulent transfer by use of direct
evidence.29 Rather, they relied on circumstantial evidence known
as "badges of fraud" from which the court could infer the exist-
ence of the requisite intent.3 0 While some badges were commonly
recognized throughout multiple states-such as transfers where
the debtor purported to transfer title but retained possession and
use of the property, or transfers for nominal consideration or no
consideration at all-each state developed its own additional and
unique badges of fraud.3 1 Eventually, the list of potential badges
became innumerable.3 2 Moreover, as courts struggled to preserve
22. Elaine A. Welle, Is It Time for Wyoming to Update Its Fraudulent Conveyance
Laws?, 5 WYo. L. REV. 207, 210 (2005); see also 13 Eliz., c.5 (1570) (Eng.).
23. Welle, supra note 22, at 210.
24. 13 Eliz., c.5 (1570) (Eng.); Welle supra note 22, at 211.
25. Welle, supra note 22, at 210-11.
26. Id. at 211.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4, prefatory note
(2006).
29. Welle, supra note 22, at 211.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 211-12.
32. Id. at 211.
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equitable outcomes in individual cases, they constantly applied
different weight to different badges in case-by-case situations.3 3
This ultimately resulted in ambiguous, confusing, and incon-
sistent fraudulent transfer law at both the intrastate and inter-
state levels.3 4
Recognizing the issues plaguing the body of fraudulent transfer
law, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") sought to promote uniformity in the applica-
tion of fraudulent transfer law by eliminating the inconsistencies
and confusion that had evolved over the years.3 5 Accordingly, in
1918, NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act ("UFCA").36 Given the dire need for clarification in this
area of the law, many commentators strongly supported the
UFCA and encouraged state legislatures to enact it." The Act al-
so received a warm welcome among its various target audiences.
Twenty-six jurisdictions ultimately enacted the UFCA. 38 Most Of
these states did so without making any substantive change to the
UFCA's provisions.39 Additionally, states that did not statutorily
enact the UFCA adopted its approach to fraudulent transfer law
by developing common law rules based on its provisions.4 0 Final-
ly, provisions of the UFCA were incorporated in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1938.41
The UFCA remained the definitive source of fraudulent trans-
fer law for the next seventy years. Over that period of time, how-
ever, several legal developments diminished the effectiveness of
the UFCA.42 These developments included changes to: (a) federal
bankruptcy statutes; (b) the Model Corporation Act; (c) the Amer-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 211-12.
35. Id. at 212. NCCUSL currently operates as the Uniform Law Commission, often
referred to as "ULC." Notice Anything Different?, UNIF. LAW COMM'N QUARTERLY REPORT
(Unif. Law Comm'n, Chicago, I.L.), Nov. 2007, at 2. However, to avoid any unnecessary
discussion as to the history of ULC and NCCUSL, this article will simply use the name
NCCUSL throughout its discussion.
36. Welle, supra note 22, at 212.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. BRIAN A. BLUM, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR, EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 73 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining that by the late 1970s the UFCA was outdated
and unable to accommodate developments in commercial law).
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ican Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct; and (d)
article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.43 Moreover, the lapse
of time brought changes to the commercial marketplace not con-
templated by the drafters of the UFCA.4 4 Accordingly, NCCUSL
set out to revise the UFCA so that it would be consistent with de-
velopments in other bodies of law and compatible with the evolv-
ing commercial marketplace."
In 1979, the NCCUSL appointed a committee to review the
UFCA with the specific purpose of drafting a revision to address
the concerns discussed above.46 The committee held its first read-
ing of the draft "revised UFCA" at the NCCUSL's annual meeting
in July of 1983.< The committee changed the name of the UFCA
to the UFTA because the term "conveyance" indicated the statute
applied only to transfers involving real property." The committee
designed the provisions of the UFTA, however, to apply to fraudu-
lent transfers of both real property and personal property.49 Alt-
hough the committee modified the name of the statute from that
of its predecessor, the basic structure and approach remained the
same.5 0
43. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4, prefatory note (2006).
Specifically, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 significantly changed the portion of the
Bankruptcy Code dealing with fraudulent transfers. See id. Additionally, the portion of the
Uniform Commercial Code regulating transfers of personal property also experienced sig-
nificant change during this time. See id.
44. See Welle, supra note 22, at 213-14.
45. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4, prefatory note (2006); see
also Welle, supra note 22, at 213-14.
46. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4, prefatory note (2006).
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The structure of the UFTA preserves the approach of the UFCA. Id. However,
there are several important substantive and organizational changes. The UFCA contains
fourteen distinct sections. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 9 U.L.A. 125 (1923). Of
these fourteen sections, five of them define the types of transfers that are fraudulent. Id.
at 127-29. The UFTA uses only two sections (sections 4 and 5) to accomplish the same
goal. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4, prefatory note (2006). Substan-
tively, the commissioners deleted, changed or added many other provisions to bring the
UFTA in line with the Bankruptcy Code and create a more equitable and less redundant
Act. See id. The UFTA contains thirteen sections. Id. at 13. The UFTA's first section de-
fines terms frequently used in the Act. Id. § 2, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 13. Section 2 defines the
term "insolvency" in detail. Id. § 2, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 37. Section 3 does the same with the
term "value." Id. § 3, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 47. Section 4 describes several instances in which
transfers are fraudulent as to present and future creditors. Id. § 4, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58. Sec-
tion 5 lays out two more situations in which transfers are fraudulent to present creditors
only. Id. § 5, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 129. Section 6 specifies exactly the point transfers are deemed
2011]1 279
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B. History of Fraudulent Transfer Law in Virginia
The Virginia Code of 1819 at chapter 101 marks the beginning
of Virginia's fraudulent transfer statutes." Like many other ju-
risdictions,5 2 Virginia incorporated Statute 13 into its statutory
framework.5 3 Although the Code of 1819 is the first "official code"
enacted by the General Assembly that centrally compiled all ex-
isting laws in force,5 4 chapter 101 first went into force January 1,
1787, as a codification of the common law of England. 5 It provid-
ed that any transfer of land or personal property made with the
intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors would be void. In
addition, it provided that a conveyance of goods or chattels made
without receipt of consideration deemed valuable in the law was
also a fraudulent transfer.5 7 The General Assembly relocated
chapter 101 to chapter 118 when it recodified the Virginia Code
in 1849.
to have been made or obligations are deemed to have occurred. Id. § 6, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 149.
Section 7 lays out the remedies for creditors that are victims of a fraudulent transfer. Id. §
7, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 155. Section 8 lists the defenses, liability, and protections for transfer-
ees. Id. § 8, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 178. Section 9 gives the applicable statute of limitations for
each claim for relief/cause of action. Id. § 9, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 194. Section 10 states that the
UFTA is subject to the general principles of law and equity unless explicitly displaced by
some part of the Act. Id. § 10, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 202. Section 11 notes that the UFTA shall be
applied in a way that effectuates the general purpose of the Act and makes the law uni-
form among enacting states. Id. § 11, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 203. Section 12 gives the short title
of the Act. Id. § 12, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 204. Finally, Section 13 offers a space for the enacting
states to repeal their existing fraudulent transfer law the UFTA is to replace. Id. § 13, 7A
pt. 2 U.L.A. 204.
51. See VA. CODE ANN., ch. 101, §§ 1-2 (1819).
52. See Welle, supra note 22, at 210-11.
53. Frederick S. Wait, Fraudulent Conveyances, in 20 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
PROCEDURE 323, 342-43 (William Mack ed., 1906) (noting that "[iun the United States
statute of 13 Elizabeth . . . has, in practically all the states, been either recognized as part
of the common law or expressly adopted or reenacted in more or less similar terms"). Wait
specifically recognizes the following states as ones incorporating statute 13 of Elizabeth
into their statutory framework or common law doctrine: Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia,
Illinois, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. at 343
n.19.
54. VA. CODE ANN., intro. cmt. (1819).
55. See VA. CODE ANN., ch. 101, § 4 & annotation (1819) (identifying commencement
date of chapter 101 and explaining that the second and third sections are taken from the
statutes of Elizabeth 13 and 27).
56. Id. § 2.
57. Id.
58. See VA. CODE ANN., ch. 118, §§ 1-2 (1849).
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The General Assembly recodified the Virginia Code once again
in 1887 and, in doing so, formed the primary structure of Virgin-
ia's current fraudulent transfer law." Virginia Code section 2458
of the Code of 1887 provided, in relevant part, that:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment, or transfer of, or charge upon,
any estate, real or personal, every suit commenced, or decree, judg-
ment, or execution suffered or obtained, and every bond or other
writing given with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors,
purchasers, or other persons of or from what they are or may be law-
fully entitled to, shall, as to such creditors, purchasers, or other per-
sons, their representatives, or assigns, be void.6 o
In addition to section 2458, the General Assembly also included
Virginia Code section 2459 in the 1887 Code." That provision ad-
dressed voluntary conveyances and conveyances made in consid-
eration of marriage. It provided that:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer, or charge, which is not
upon consideration deemed valuable in law, or which is upon consid-
eration of marriage, shall be void as to creditors whose debts shall
have been contracted at the time it was made, but shall not, on that
account, merely be void as to creditors whose debts shall have been
contracted or as to purchasers who shall have purchased after it was
made; and though it be decreed to be void as to a prior creditor, be-
cause voluntary or upon consideration of marriage, it shall not, for
that cause, be decreed to be void as to subsequent creditors or pur-
chasers.62
When the General Assembly recodified the Virginia Code in 1919,
it relocated sections 2458 and 2459 to sections 5184 and 5185, re-
spectively.6 3 The recodification did not, however, alter the sub-
stance of the statutes in any way.6 4
In 1950, the General Assembly recodified the Virginia Code as
its current structure. Virginia Code section 5184-the provision
governing transfers of real or personal property made with the in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors-became Virginia Code
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2458 (1887). Specifically, the General Assembly structured
fraudulent transfer law so that transfer made with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud
creditors would be addressed by one statute and voluntary transfers made for inadequate
consideration would be addressed by another. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 2459.
62. Id.
63. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-5184, -5185 (1919).
64. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-2458, -2459 (1887), with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-5184,
-5185 (1919).
2812011]
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section 55-80." Virginia Code section 5185 became Virginia Code
section 55-81.66 Virginia Code section 55-80 did not differ from
Virginia Code section 5184 substantively as a result of the recodi-
fication and, indeed, remains unchanged to this day.6 7 According-
ly, Virginia Code section 55-80 provides that:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment or transfer of, or charge upon,
any estate, real or personal, every suit commenced or decree, judg-
ment or execution suffered or obtained and every bond or other writ-
ing given with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchas-
ers or other persons of or from what they are or may be lawfully
entitled to shall, as to such creditors, purchasers or other persons,
their representatives or assigns, be void.
Originally, Virginia Code section 55-81-the provision address-
ing conveyances for consideration not deemed valuable in law-
also did not vary in substance from its predecessor, Virginia Code
section 5185. In 1988, however, the General Assembly made a
significant substantive amendment to Virginia Code section 55-
81.0 Following the amendment, a creditor seeking to avoid a
transfer pursuant to Virginia Code section 55-81 still needs to
demonstrate that the transfer involved no consideration deemed
valuable in the law.7 1 However, the General Assembly inserted an
additional requirement into the statute that "the party seeking to
avoid the transfer must prove that the transferor was insolvent at
the time the transfer was made or was rendered insolvent as a
result of the transfer."72
Accordingly, following the July 1, 1988 amendment, Virginia
Code section 55-81 provided-and currently provides-that:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer or charge which is not
upon consideration deemed valuable in law, or which is upon consid-
eration of marriage, by an insolvent transferor, or by a transferor
who is thereby rendered insolvent, shall be void as to creditors
whose debts shall have been contracted at the time it was made, but
65. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 46-5184 (1919), with VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (1950).
66. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 46-5185 (1919), with VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (1950).
67. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 46-5184 (1919), with VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (1950).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
69. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 46-5185 (1919), with VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (1950).
70. Act of Apr. 3, 1988, ch. 512, 1988 Va. Acts 624 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011) (inserting requirement of debtor insol-
vency into Virginia Code section 55-81)).
71. Id.
72. Leake v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 108 B.R. 112, 113 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989).
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shall not, on that account merely, be void as to creditors whose debts
shall have been contracted or as to purchasers who shall have pur-
chased after it was made. Even though it is decreed to be void as to a
prior creditor, because voluntary or upon consideration of marriage,
it shall not, for that cause, be decreed to be void as to subsequent
creditors or purchasers.73
Virginia's current statutory framework lacks the thorough cover-
age provided by the UFTA and leaves to common law many issues
which the UFTA expressly addresses. Indeed, Virginia is one of
eight U.S. jurisdictions that has not adopted the UFTA." The
failure of the General Assembly to adopt the UFTA, however, is
not the result of a lack of awareness of UFTA or its potential ben-
efits. As with all other states, several appointed commissioners
represent Virginia at the NCCUSL." Each year, these commis-
sioners prepare reports on the status of various uniform laws be-
ing considered at the NCCUSL and make recommendations to
the General Assembly as to what uniform laws should be adopt-
ed.
The NCCUSL has been meeting every year since 1892.6 Vir-
ginia began sending commissioners appointed by the governor in
1898.7' The first recommendation by commissioners to adopt a
uniform act concerning fraudulent transfers came in 1920.78 That
year, the Virginia commissioners recommended that Governor
Westmoreland Davis and the General Assembly adopt five uni-
form acts:79 The Uniform Sales Act of 1906; The Uniform Bill of
Lading Act of 1909; The Uniform Stock Transfer Act of 1909; The
Uniform Conditional Sales Act of 1918; and The Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyances Act of 1918.o Together, these five acts-with
the four other uniform acts Virginia had already adopted-made
up what, at the time, were known as the Uniform Commercial
Acts."' The commissioners urged the General Assembly of 1920 to
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Rep. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
74. See UFTA Legislative Fact Sheet, supra note 8.
75. REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., Report Doc. No. 116, at 6-
7(2010).
76. Id. at 1.
77. REPORT OF COMM'RS FOR THE PROMOTION OF UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 5, at 1 (1920).
78. Id. at 2-3.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 3.
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"place Virginia in line with the great progressive [s]tates with
which she has commercial dealings by adopting the rest of these
[U]niform [C]ommercial [A]cts." 8 2
The Senate of Virginia acted on the suggestions contained in
the commissioner's report. It introduced bills relating to all five of
the Uniform Commercial Acts, which Virginia had not yet adopt-
ed.83 Germane to this article is Senate Bill 177 ("S.B. 177"), intro-
duced on January 30, 1920 by Senator Julien Gunn of District
35.84 S.B. 177 was coined "[a] bill concerning fraudulent convey-
ances and to make uniform the law relating thereto." The senate
forwarded S.B. 177 to the Committee for Courts of Justice for re-
view." Several weeks later on February 19, 1920, the senate read
for a third time and unanimously passed S.B. 177 by a vote of 38
to 0." On February 20, 1920, the House of Delegates recognized
that the senate had passed S.B. 177 and referred the bill to the
House Committee on General Laws." There is no record that the
house dismissed S.B. 177 or that the governor vetoed the bill, and
it appears that S.B. 177 died in committee. 9 The other four Uni-
form Commercial Acts met similar fates. 90 While this is the clos-
est the General Assembly ever came to adopting the UFCA, it
was not the last time the General Assembly considered its adop-
tion.
In 1922, Senator Cannon took up the cause, presenting Senate
Bill 258 ("S.B. 258"): "A bill concerning fraudulent conveyances,
and to make uniform the law relating thereto."9 1 The senate re-
ferred S.B. 258 to the Committee for Courts of Justice.9 2 There is
no record that the bill ever made it out of committee or that ei-
ther the senate or house took any further action.9 3 Finally, Virgin-
82. Id.
83. S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. 991-92 (1920).
84. Id. at 102.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 298, 305.
88. H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. 359, 363 (1920).
89. See id. at 995.
90. Id.: see also S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. 991-92 (showing that S.B. 176,
a bill making uniform the transfer of stock at corporations, was dismissed by the house,
and that the others appear to have died in committee).
91. S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. 181 (1922).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1046.
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ia's flirtation with the UFCA ended in 1924, when Senator B.F.
Buchannan presented Senate Bill 87 ("S.B. 87"): "[A] bill concern-
ing fraudulent conveyances, and to make uniform the law relat-
ing thereto."" S.B. 87 suffered the same fate as its 1922 predeces-
sor. The senate took up the bill and referred it to the Committee
for Courts of Justice, where it died.95
The commissioners' last mention of the UFCA and, consequent-
ly, their first mention of the UFTA came in their 1984 report." At
that point, the report only noted that the NCCUSL intended to
produce a "Revised Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act" in the
future.97 The commissioners next raised the issue of the UFTA to
the General Assembly in their 1986 report.98 By that time, the
NCCUSL had finalized the UFTA and the Act had been sent to
the states for consideration by their legislatures." The commis-
sioners strongly recommended the General Assembly adopt the
UFTA on the grounds that it "conform[s] the earlier Act to the
present Bankruptcy Code provisions and decisional law, and re-
solves substantial legal issues that provide better protection for
creditors from fraudulent transfers.""oo The General Assembly
was slow to respond to this recommendation, however, and the
commissioners continued to insist that Virginia adopt the UFTA
without any progress until 1990.101 In that year, Delegate Richard
Cranwell sponsored House Bill 243 ("H.B. 243").102 That bill pro-
posed that the General Assembly adopt the UFTA and repeal
94. S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. 51 (1924).
95. See id. at 918.
96. REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 4, at 4 (1984).
97. Id.
98. REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 5, at 4 (1986).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 5.
101. See REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 8, at 6-7
(1990); REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 3, at 5-6
(1989); REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 4, at 6-7
(1988); REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 3, at 4 (1987).
102. H.B. 243, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1990).
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Virginia Code sections 55-80, 55-81, and 55-82.103 The General
Assembly did not vote on the bill, but carried it over for future
consideration in the 1991 session. 104 The General Assembly failed
to reconsider the bill in 1991, however, because the Virginia Bar
Association and the Virginia Banker's Association did not thor-
oughly review the Act and form a position on it by that time.10 5
Accordingly, both organizations requested that consideration of
the UFTA be carried over to the 1992 session and the commis-
sioners agreed."0o During the 1992 session, Senator Robert Cal-
houn sponsored Senate Bill 144 ("S.B. 144").107 As with H.B. 243,
S.B. 144 proposed the General Assembly adopt the UFTA and re-
peal Virginia Code sections 55-80, 55-81, and 55-82.10 Once
again, the General Assembly did not vote on the bill, but decided
to carry it over until 1993 to allow the Virginia Bar Association
and the Virginia Banker's Association further time prepare input
on the UFTA.10 9 In 1993, the commissioners made their final rec-
ommendation that the General Assembly adopt the UFTA.1xo
However, no delegate or senator introduced a bill to do so, and no
further action was taken.
After 1993, the commissioners never again raised the issue of
adopting the UFTA to the Virginia General Assembly. It seems
therefore that Virginia's continued reliance on Virginia Code sec-
tions 55-80 and 55-81 is not the product of the General Assembly
consciously rejecting the UFTA. Rather, it appears the commis-
sioners strongly supported the adoption of the UFTA for nearly a
decade, but the matter never reached a final resolution within the
legislature.
103. REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 23, at 6
(1991).
104. Id.
105. REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 18, at 6 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 VA. COMM'Rs REPORT].
106. Id.
107. REPORT OF THE VA. COMM'RS TO THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., H. Doc. No. 34, at 6 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 VA. COMM'RS REPORT]; S.B. 144, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1992).
108. S.B. 144.
109. 1992 VA. COMM'RS REPORT, supra note 105, at 6.
110. 1993 VA. COMM'RS REPORT, supra note 107, at 6.
286 [Vol. 46:273
TRANSFER LAW
III. ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY ISSUES
Virginia Code sections 55-80 and 55-81 have similar counter-
parts in the UFTA. In the same manner that Virginia Code sec-
tion 55-80 recognizes that certain creditors may avoid debtor
transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud those
creditors,"' section 4(a)(1) of the UFTA enables certain creditors
to avoid debtor transfers made with such intent." 2 Additionally,
Virginia Code section 55-81 allows creditors, regardless of the
debtor's intent, to avoid transfers for which the debtor did not re-
ceive consideration "deemed valuable in the law."" 3 A similar
provision appears in the UFTA in section 5(a), which enables
creditors to avoid transfers made without receiving "reasonably
equivalent value."" 4
There is, however, a provision in the UFTA for which no Vir-
ginia statutory counterpart exists-section 4(a)(2). Section 4(a)(2)
deals with specific situations that the UFTA deems to be con-
structively fraudulent-transfers that are fraudulent without re-
gard to the debtor's intent."' This section will attempt to identify
transfers that Virginia's fraudulent transfer statutes treat differ-
ently than the UFTA or simply fail to address. In this regard,
Part III.A will compare the Virginia statutes to their UFTA coun-
terparts. Part III.B will examine UFTA provision 4(a)(2), which,
as mentioned above, has no Virginia counterpart.
A. Identifying the Differences Between the Virginia Provisions
and Their UFTA Counterparts
1. Virginia Code Section 55-80 and UFTA Section 4(a)(1)
As noted above, both section 55-80 and section 4(a)(1) specifi-
cally govern those transfers made by the debtor with an intent to
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011); see also Hyman v.
Porter (In re Porter), 37 B.R. 56, 63 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (citing 9A MICHIE'S
JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY
CONVEYANCES § 12 (Repl. Vol. 1977)).
112. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011); see also Balzer & As-
socs., Inc. v. The Lakes on 360, Inc., 250 Va. 527, 531, 463 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1995).
114. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 129 (2006).
115. Id. § 4(a)(2), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58, 59 cmt. 5; see also Wells v. Sleep (In re Mich.
Mach. Tool Control Corp.), 381 B.R. 657, 667 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008).
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hinder, delay, or defraud creditors."1 The two provisions operate
similarly in many respects. Under both statutes, either a present
creditor or future creditor may seek to avoid the alleged fraudu-
lent transfer.1 17 A creditor seeking to avoid a transfer pursuant to
section 55-80 must prove her case by clear and convincing evi-
dence.1 18 Most UFTA jurisdictions impose the same burden of
proof on creditors to avoid a transfer pursuant to section
4(a)(1).119 Additionally, both statutes allow creditors to prove the
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud by using either direct evidence
or circumstantial evidence.1 20 More often than not, creditors rely
on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the presence of certain
conditions surrounding the transaction.1 2 ' These conditions are
referred to as "badges of fraud."12 2 One minor difference between
the UFTA and Virginia's statutory framework is that the UFTA
enumerates what it contemplates as badges of fraud in section
4,123 whereas Virginia defines its badges of fraud through common
law. 124
116. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
117. Balzer & Assocs., Inc., 250 Va. at 530-31, 463 S.E.2d at 455; UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT § 4(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006) (stating that a transfer "is fraudulent as to
a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred" if the statutory requirements are proved).
118. Hutcheson v. Says. Bank of Richmond, 129 Va. 281, 289, 105 S.E. 677, 680 (1921).
Indeed, "[t]he law never presumes fraud, but the presumption is always in favor of inno-
cence and honesty." Id. (citing N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 96 Va. 737, 739, 32 S.E. 475, 475
(1899)).
119. See, e.g., Spangler v. Redick, 600 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (explaining
that Ohio uses a clear and convincing standard to determine whether a transfer is fraudu-
lent as to creditors). But see Woodard v. Stewart (In re Stewart), 280 B.R. 268, 274 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2001) (explaining that Florida uses a preponderance of the evidence standard to
determine whether a transfer is fraudulent as to creditors).
120. Hyman v. Porter (In re Porter), 37 B.R. 56, 63 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (citing
Fowlkes v. Tucker, 164 Va. 507, 514-15, 180 S.E. 302, 305 (1935); Hutcheson, 129 Va. at
289, 105 S.E. at 680; Witz, Biedler & Co. v. Osburn, 83 Va. 227, 228, 230, 2 S.E. 33, 34-45
(1877)).
121. Hutcheson, 129 Va. at 289, 105 S.E. at 680 ("The charge of fraud is one easily
made, and the burden of proving it rests on the party alleging its existence. It may be
proved, not only by positive and direct evidence, but by showing facts and circumstances
sufficient to support the conclusion of fraud.").
122. Bernstein Bros. Mgmt. v. Miller, 44 Va. Cir. 69, 75-76 (1997) (Fairfax County)
("The requirement of showing actual intent can usually be shown only by circumstantial
evidence in the form of certain 'badges of fraud' from which the fraudulent intent may be
inferred." (citing Fowlkes, 164 Va. at 514, 180 S.E. at 304-05 (1935)); Hutcheson, 129 Va.
at 289-91, 105 S.E. at 680-81 (1921); Todd v. Sykes, 97 Va. 143, 147, 33 S.E. 517, 519
(1899); Witz, Biedler & Co., 83 Va. at 230, 2 S.E. at 35 (1887); In re Porter, 37 B.R. at 63)).
123. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58-59 (2006). Section
4(b) of the UFTA recognizes the badges of fraud as including:
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Furthermore, the range of creditors protected by section 4(a)(1)
is significantly larger than those creditors who enjoy the protec-
tion of section 55-80. Namely, section 4(a)(1) enables a creditor to
avoid a transfer if the debtor makes a transfer or incurs an obli-
gation "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any credi-
tor of the debtor."12 5 A straightforward reading of this statutory
language indicates that a debtor who makes a transfer with actu-
al intent to hinder, delay, or defraud even a single creditor opens
the door for any of her creditors to avoid the transfer pursuant to
section 4(a)(1). This will be referred to as "general intent."1 2 6 In
other words, the UFTA theoretically allows Creditor X to set
aside a transfer as fraudulent even though the debtor only made
the transfer with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Creditor
Y.
This concept must be contrasted against the language of Vir-
ginia Code section 55-80. That provision voids any transfer "with
intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers or other
persons of or from what they are or may be lawfully entitled ...
[only] as to such creditors, purchasers, or other persons."12 7 A
straightforward reading of this statutory language indicates that
a creditor may only set aside a transfer as a fraudulent transfer
in violation of the statute if the creditor is capable of proving that
the debtor intended the transfer to hinder, delay, or defraud that
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (2) the debtor retained posses-
sion or control of the property transferred after the transfer; (3) the transfer
or obligation was disclosed or concealed; (4) before the transfer was made or
obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; (5)
the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; (6) the debtor ab-
sconded; (7) the debtor removed or concealed assets; (8) the value of the con-
sideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of
the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; (9) the debtor
was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred; (10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly
after a substantial debt was incurred; and (11) the debtor transferred the es-
sential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an in-
sider of the debtor.
Id.
124. In Virginia, the badges of fraud consist of: "(1) the relationship of the parties; (2)
the grantor's insolvency; (3) pursuit of the grantor by creditors; (4) want of consideration;
(5) retention of possession of the transferred property by the grantor; (6) incurring debt
fraudulently after the transfer." Dollar v. Dollar, 27 Va. Cir. 474, 475 (1983) (Frederick
County).
125. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006) (emphasis
added).
126. Id.
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
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specific creditor. This will be called "specific intent." This is un-
like the UFTA, which only requires that the debtor intended to
hinder, delay, or defraud "any creditor" for a creditor to make use
of the statute. 1 28 For example, under this reading of the statute,
Virginia Code section 55-80 only allows Creditor X to set aside a
transfer as fraudulent if the debtor specifically intended to hin-
der, delay, or defraud Creditor X. If the debtor only intended to
hinder, delay, or defraud Creditor Y when she made the transfer,
Creditor X would not be able to avoid the transfer under Virginia
Code section 55-80.129
The court's decision in Bernstein Bros. Management v. Miller,
supports the premise that Virginia Code section 55-80 requires
"specific intent" to avoid the transfer."'o The case involved a re-
tired employee ("the Debtor") of Bernstein Brothers Management
("BBM") who, during her tenure with the company, embezzled
over $1 million in company funds.13 1 BBM discovered the embez-
zlement after the Debtor's retirement.1 3 2 By that time, however,
the Debtor had given a significant amount of the funds away to
various individuals.1 3 3 BBM brought suit to void the transfers as
fraudulent in violation of Virginia Code section 55-80.134 In dis-
cussing BBM's burden of proof under the statute, the court ex-
plained that, "[iln order to prevail [under Virginia Code section
55-80], BBM is required to show that [the Debtor's] gifts to her
children and grandchildren were made with the intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud BBM."1 35
128. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
129. However, the right to avoid a fraudulent transfer is not personal to the specific
creditor that the debtor intended to defraud. Accordingly, if the debtor intended to hinder,
delay, or defraud Creditor X in making the transfer and Creditor X subsequently assigns
his claim, the assignee will always be able to avoid the transfer pursuant to section 55-80.
See Nat'l Valley Bank v. Hancock, 100 Va. 101, 106, 40 S.E. 611, 613 (1902).
130. 44 Va. Cir. 69 (1997) (Fairfax County).
131. Id. at 71.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 72.
134. Id. at 75.
135. Id.; see also Efessiou v. Efessiou, 41 Va. Cir. 142, 145 (1996) (Fairfax County)
("The requisite elements of a fraudulent conveyance under Code 55-80 are (i) the convey-
ance of property to another (ii) with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud (iii) a creditor,
purchaser, or other person (iv) from what they are or may be lawfully entitled to."); Con-
solidated Bank & Trust Co. v. Thornhill, No. 93CHD01260, 1994 WL 16795199, at *1 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 1994) (Richmond City) (avoiding transfers made to a trust because the
transfer were made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, including the
plaintiff).
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Buchanan v. Buchanan is another case that lends support for
reading Virginia Code section 55-80 as requiring "specific in-
tent."13 6 In Buchanan, the plaintiff challenged certain transfers
made by her ex-husband to his mother as fraudulent under Vir-
ginia Code section 55-80.1'3 After the trial court found the trans-
fers to be fraudulent, the ex-husband appealed on the grounds
that the claims were unliquidated and contingent at the time of
transfer."as The court rejected this argument and then briefly dis-
cussed the intent requirement under section 55-80.139 While the
court did not establish clear standards regarding the intent re-
quirement, it did discuss the importance of the trial court's find-
ing of the requisite intent.14 0 The discussion focused on the trial
court's finding that the transfers at issue were specifically in-
tended to defraud the transferor's ex-wife in contemplation of
their impending divorce-as opposed to an intent by the debtor to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors generally.14 1
It does not appear, however, that any Virginia court has ex-
pressly stated that "specific intent" is a requirement of section 55-
80. Indeed, some opinions applying the statute discuss it in a way
that indicates only a general intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors is required for any creditor to avoid the transfer under
the statute. For example, one court stated:
Virginia Code § 55-80 allows any creditor to petition a court to void a
conveyance of any type from its debtor to a third party on the basis
that valuable consideration was not obtained and that it was there-
fore fraudulently made. The creditor need only show that the con-
veyance was made with the intent to delay, hinder, or defraud credi-
tors.142
Thus, the law on this issue is neither clear nor settled. It may be
that situations in which a debtor makes a transfer with the intent
simply to hinder, delay, or defraud some of her creditors and not
others is sufficiently rare that Virginia courts have yet to need to
136. 266 Va. 207, 210-41, 585 S.E.2d 533, 534-55 (2003).
137. Id. at 211, 585 S.E.2d at 535.
138. Id. at 212, 585 S.E.2d at 536.
139. Id. at 212-13, 585 S.E.2d at 536.
140. Id. at 213, 585 S.E.2d at 536.
141. Id.
142. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. P.R.T. Enters., Inc., 65 Va. Cir. 271, 276 (2004) (Nor-
folk City).
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provide direct guidance on the issue. Whatever the reason for the
ambiguity in this area of the law, practitioners need to be wary
when advising clients on the likelihood of avoiding an alleged
fraudulent transfer if the evidence supports that the requisite in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud existed as to some creditors but
not others.
One additional difference worth noting is the result of a recent
development in the law. It appears that Virginia Code section 55-
80 may also require the party seeking to set aside the transfer to
prove facts demonstrating the transferee has notice of the debt-
or's fraudulent intent. 14 3 Such an interpretation of the statute is
seen in In re Taneja.'4 4 In that case, the trustee sought to set
aside certain transfers as fraudulent in violation of Virginia Code
section 55-80.145 The transferees argued that the statute's lan-
guage stating, "[t]his section shall not affect the title of a pur-
chaser for valuable consideration, unless it appear that he had
notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor or the
fraud rendering void the title of such grantor," stood for the prop-
osition that the trustee had the burden of proving they had notice
of the transferor's fraudulent intent in order to avoid the trans-
fers.1 46 The trustee argued the same language merely provided an
affirmative defense to a purchaser for value where intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud was present.14 7
The court determined, based on a prior Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia case, that "it seems clear that a plaintiff attacking a fraudu-
lent conveyance under [section] 55-80 must always allege, as part
of its cause of action, not only the debtor's fraudulent intent in
making the transfer, but the transferee's notice of that intent."14 8
Such a reading is at great variance with section 55-80's UFTA
counterpart.'4 9 Section 4(a)(1) does not require any proof regard-
ing the mental state of the transferee in order for the provision to
143. In re Taneja, No. 08-13293-SSM, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1549, at *11-12 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. Apr. 26, 2011); Alf v. Galen Capital Corp., No. CL-2011-3208, 2011 Va. Cir. LEXIS 93,
at *6, *9, *10 (July 12, 2011) (Fairfax County).
144. In re Taneja, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1549, at *1-2.
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *6-7.
147. Id. at *7.
148. Id. at *11-12.
149. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
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be applicable."'o Thus, a creditor seeking to avoid a transfer pur-
suant to section 4(a)(1) maintains a lesser burden of proof in or-
der to prevail.
Indeed, In re Taneja is illustrative of this point. In ruling on
the trustee's attempt to avoid the transfers, the court explained
that there was no question that the plaintiff pleaded sufficient
facts to show the debtor made the subject transfers with the in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors."' In a jurisdiction that
adopted UFTA section 4(a)(1), this showing alone would be suffi-
cient grounds to avoid the transfer. However, the added require-
ment of proving the transferee had notice of the debtor's fraudu-
lent intent was a sufficient hurdle to prevent the trustee from
relying on section 55-80 to avoid the transfer.1 5 2
Although, as a general matter, the provisions of the UFTA pro-
vide greater protection to creditors than Virginia's fraudulent
transfer statutes, this is not always the case. Virginia Code sec-
tion 55-80 provides greater protection to creditors in at least one
regard. Specifically, section 4(a)(1) is subject to the statute of lim-
itations outlined in section 9(a)."'3 Section 9(a) limits the time in
which a creditor may bring a cause of action under the statute to
"[four] years after the transfer was made or the obligation was in-
curred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation
was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.""'
In contrast, Virginia Code section 55-80 is not subject to a statu-
tory or common law statute of limitations. Rather, the only time
limitation imposed on creditors for bringing their cause of action
is the equitable doctrine of laches."' Relying on this doctrine, the
Supreme Court of Virginia has avoided fraudulent transfers up to
ten years after the transfer took place.5 ' Achieving the same re-
sult under section 4(a)(1) of the UFTA, while not impossible, is
150. In re Taneja, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1549, at *11-12.
151. Id at *3 n.2.
152. Id. at *11-12.
153. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(a)(1), 9(a), 7 pt. 2 U.L.A. 194 (2006).
154. Id. § 9(a).
155. See Bartl v. Ochsner (In re Ichiban, Inc.), No. 06-10316-SSM, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS
1255, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); Gold v. Laines (In re Laines), 352 B.R. 397, 402 n.5
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005); In re Massey, 225 B.R. 887, 890 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998); Hyman v.
Porter (In re Porter), 37 B.R. 56, 66 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
156. Atkinson v. Solenberger, 112 Va. 667, 669, 72 S.E. 727, 728 (1911) (suit instituted
nine years after conveyance was recorded); Flook v. Armentrout's Adm'r, 100 Va. 638,
639-40, 42 S.E. 686, 686 (1902) (suit brought ten years after conveyance was recorded).
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fairly unlikely. Accordingly, this is one of the few ways in which
Virginia's fraudulent transfer statutes offer greater protection to
creditors than the UFTA.
2. Virginia Code Section 55-81 and UFTA Section 5(a)
Virginia Code section 55-81 and UFTA section 5(a) both ad-
dress the situation in which a debtor receives insufficient consid-
eration for a transfer made when the debtor was insolvent or the
debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer.15 7 The stat-
utes are similar in two ways. First, only a present creditor of the
debtor may attempt to avoid an alleged fraudulent transfer under
either statute.' Secondly, both statutes require that the transfer
at issue involve some degree of inadequate consideration and that
the debtor be insolvent at the time of the transfer or become in-
solvent as a result of the transfer. 159 In this regard, the term "in-
solvency" under either statute contemplates the situation where a
debtor's liabilities exceed her assets. 16 0 Despite these similarities,
however, Virginia Code section 55-81 and UFTA section 5(a) also
have some noteworthy differences.
One such difference is that the statutes rely on different meas-
uring rods in order to test the adequacy of the consideration re-
ceived in exchange for the transfer or obligation. Virginia Code
section 55-81 couches the issue in terms of "consideration deemed
valuable in law," whereas UFTA section 5(a) is concerned with
157. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011) (providing
that the creditor of an insolvent debtor may avoid a transfer not made for consideration
deemed valuable in the law), with UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A pt. 2
U.L.A. 129 (2006) (providing that the creditor of an insolvent debtor may avoid a transfer
not made for consideration of reasonably equivalent value).
158. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011) (stating that
a transfer made by an insolvent debtor for consideration not deemed valuable in the law
shall not be void as to subsequent creditors or purchasers), with UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 129 (2006) (stating that only a creditor "whose claim
arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the
transfer or incurred the obligation" may avoid a transfer under that provision).
159. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011) (providing
that the creditor of an insolvent debtor may avoid a transfer not made for consideration
deemed valuable in the law), with UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A pt. 2
U.L.A. 129 (2006) (providing the creditor of an insolvent debtor may avoid a transfer not
made for consideration of reasonably equivalent value).
160. Hudson v. Hudson, 249 Va. 335, 340-41, 455 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1995); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 37 (2006).
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"reasonably equivalent value.""'1 The difference in these two
standards extends beyond their terminology. Section 3(a)'s "rea-
sonably equivalent value" language is based on the standard
found in section 548(d)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 16 2 This
standard is not defined or applied by use of a bright line rule.163
Rather than rely on a rigid mathematical calculation, courts typi-
cally look at the facts of each case and determine reasonably
equivalent value by examining factors such as the good faith of
the transferee, the fair market value of the asset transferred, the
percentage of fair market value paid for the asset, and whether
the transferor and transferee agreed on the terms of the transfer
as the result of "arms-length" bargaining between a willing buyer
and a willing seller.16 4
As ambiguous as section 5(a)'s reasonably equivalent standard
may be, it can be argued that it is an elevated standard of consid-
eration in comparison to Virginia Code section 55-81's "considera-
tion deemed valuable in law" standard. Although there is no Vir-
ginia authority available which directly compares section 5(a)'s
standard with Virginia Code section 55-81's standard, several
federal cases compare section 548's "reasonably equivalent value"
161. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. & Cum. Supp. 2011), with UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 129 (2006).
162. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3 cmt. 2, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 47 (2006).
163. Lindquist v. JNG Corp. (In re Lindell), 334 B.R. 249, 255-56 (Bankr. D. Minn.
2005) ("There is no bright line rule used to determine when reasonably equivalent value is
given."); see also Barber v. Golden Seed Co., 129 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that
"the standard for [r]easonable equivalence should depend on all the facts of each case" (cit-
ing In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988))); In re Northgate Computer Sys., Inc.,
240 B.R. 328, 365 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1999); cf. In re Lindell, 334 B.R. at 255 ("When evalu-
ating a transfer for reasonable equivalency under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(I) a court must
examine the entire situation." (citing Jacoway v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.),
850 F.2d 342, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1988))).
164. Cooper v. Ashley Commc'ns, Inc. (In re Morris Comm'ns NC, Inc.), 914 F.2d 458,
466-67 (4th Cir. 1990). While "reasonably equivalent value" is not synonymous with fair
market value, fair market value is significant to determining reasonably equivalent value.
In re Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824; see also Brandt v. Vidia Corp. (In re 3DFX Interactive,
Inc.), 389 B.R. 842, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) ("Fair market value . is what a hypo-
thetical willing buyer and seller agree upon when possessed of relevant facts."). Although
the UFTA does not provide a clear definition for "reasonably equivalent value," it does es-
tablish that:
For the purposes of [s]ections 4(a)(2) and 5, a person gives a reasonably
equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset
pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution
of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debt-
or upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(b), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 47 (2006).
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standard with Virginia's consideration deemed valuable in the
law" standard.1 6 5 As noted above, these comparisons are relevant
to the issue because section 5(a) adopted its standard from section
548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 166 Accordingly, it is not uncommon
for courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the UFTA to turn to
bankruptcy opinions in analyzing a "reasonably equivalent value"
issue under the UFTA.167 Bankruptcy courts that have compared
the Bankruptcy's Code's "reasonably equivalent value" standard
with section 55-81's "consideration deemed valuable in law"
standard have concluded the two standards are not the same. 6 1
As one court observed, in order for a creditor to avoid a transfer
under Virginia Code section 55-81 "there must have been no 'con-
sideration deemed valuable in law,' which is not required to be
reasonably equivalent to whatever has been exchanged. Consid-
eration under section 55-81 requires only that something of value
was gained."1 69
Accordingly, if this interpretation of "consideration deemed
valuable in the law" is correct, section 55-81 offers more protec-
tion than section 5(a) to the proponent of an allegedly fraudulent
transfer because the consideration involved in the transfer need
not have monetary value or be reasonably equivalent in value to
165. See C-T of Va., Inc. v. Euroshoe Assoc. Ltd., 953 F.2d 637, at *2-4 (4th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished table decision) (full text available in LEXIS, No. 91-1578, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1029 (4th Cir. Jan. 29, 1992)); Smith v. Porter (In re Carr & Porter, L.L.C.), 416
B.R. 239, 261-62 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009); Schnelling v. Crawford (In re James River Coal
Co.), 360 B.R. 139, 167 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
166. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3 cmt. 2, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 47 (2006).
167. See, e.g., Apollo Real Estate Inv. Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 935 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010); CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. CLGP, L.L.C., No. 09CA1368, 2010 Colo. App.
LEXIS 1050, at *9-11 (July 22, 2010) (stating that bankruptcy opinions are one of three
sources the court draws on to interpret the UFTA).
168. See In re Carr & Porter, L.L.C., 416 B.R. at 261-62; In re James River Coal Co.,
360 B.R. at 167.
169. In re Carr & Porter, L.L.C., 416 B.R. at 273 (citing In re James River Coal Co., 360
BR. at 167; Wellington Apt., L.L.C. v. Clotworthy (In re Wellington Apt., L.L.C.), 350 B.R.
213, 245 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006)). The basis for the court's holding in Smith can be traced
back to a 1992 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, C-T
of Virginia, Inc., No. 91-1578, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1029 (4th Cir. Jan. 29, 1992). The
case focused on the question whether section 55-80's "consideration deemed valuable in
the law" standard could be equated to the "reasonably equivalent value" standard of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at *4. Noting that no Virginia court had previously decided the ques-
tion, the Fourth Circuit relied on a West Virginia case involving the same issue decided
under section 55-81. Id. (citing Inspiration Coal, Inc. v. Mullins, 690 F. Supp. 1502, 1505
(W.D. Va. 1988)). Relying on Inspiration Coal, the court concluded that section 55-81 does
not require the consideration involved in the transfer have economic value or meet the
reasonably equivalent value standard. Id.
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the interest transferred. 170 Rather, it simply must have some le-
gally cognizable value. One bankruptcy court indicated the im-
portance of the distinction in In re Carr & Porter, L.L.C. 71 The
debtor in Carr was a Virginia professional limited liability com-
pany engaged in the practice of law.172 Porter originally acted as
the sole owner and managing member of the firm.173 Porter sub-
sequently entered into a purchase agreement with two employees
of the firm.'7 4 The purchase agreement provided that Porter
would withdraw from the debtor as an equity partner, his equity
interest would be purchased by the debtor at a price of $1 million
(paid in installments), he would continue to work for the debtor
with compensation to be determined on his realized fees, and the
two employees involved in the purchase agreement would guar-
antee the debtor's payment.7 7 The firm eventually filed bank-
ruptcy, but not before paying Porter $255,500 pursuant to the
purchase agreement.1 7 ' The bankruptcy trustee challenged these
transfers to Porter as fraudulent, in violation of Virginia Code
section 55-81.in
The trustee argued that the purchase agreement lacked ade-
quate consideration necessary to meet the "consideration deemed
valuable in [the] law" standard under Virginia Code section 55-
81.17s Specifically, the trustee argued the debtor did not receive
any new value from Porter as a result of the agreement, yet still
incurred significant financial expense. 1 79 In approaching this ar-
gument, the court began its analysis by noting that Virginia Code
section 55-81's "consideration deemed valuable at law" standard
"differs substantially from the more familiar standard of [reason-
ably equivalent value]."1so Unlike the latter, the former is satis-
fied by a transfer of "any valuable consideration received by the
170. See C-T of Va., Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1029, at *4 (finding that as long as
something is gained, that is sufficient consideration to prevent avoiding a transfer pursu-
ant to Virginia Code section 55-81).
171. In re Carr & Porter, L.L.C., 416 B.R. at 261-63.
172. Id. at 242.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 242-43.
176. Id. at 243-44 & n.3.
177. Id. at 242.
178. See id. at 243-44, 261 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum.
Supp. 2011)).
179. See id. at 243 n.2.
180. Id. at 261.
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transferor.""s1 Although the court agreed that Porter did not pro-
vide new value to the firm, it noted that because of the purchase
agreement, "the [d]ebtor continued its existence with all of its
substantial financial assets of cash, accounts, and work in pro-
gress, as well as its intangible-but nonetheless valuable-assets,
such as its established client relationships and goodwill."18 2 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that "[gliven the absence of the ne-
cessity of equivalency of consideration under Virginia Code § 55-
81, the employment agreements of the [d]ebtor with Tribble and
Porter alone are sufficient to legally establish that the [d]ebtor
received 'consideration deemed valuable at law' as a result of the
transaction with Porter."1 8 3 Thus, the court's discussion of the is-
sue indicates that it may have found Porter's consideration to the
debtor inadequate had it been scrutinized under section 548's
"reasonably equivalent value" standard.1 8 4
As with Virginia Code section 55-80, Virginia Code section 55-
81 does in one respect offer more favorable treatment than UFTA
section 5(a) to creditors seeking to avoid a purportedly fraudulent
transfer. The statute of limitations for bringing a section 5(a) ac-
tion is identified in section 9(b), which provides that a creditor
must bring such an action "within [four] years after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred."8 5 On the other hand,
Virginia Code section 55-81 is subject to the statute of limitations
identified in Virginia Code section 8.01-253.186 Section 8.01-253
requires that a creditor attempting to avoid a transfer pursuant
to section 55-81 must bring the action "within five years from its
recordation, and if not so recorded within five years from the time
the same was or should have been discovered.""' Thus, section
8.01-253 permits a creditor more time to bring an avoidance ac-
tion if the transfer is recorded and, if not recorded, tolls the run-
ning of the statute of limitations until the creditor should have
181. Id. (quoting Shaia v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 244 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2001)).
182. Id. at 263.
183. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Adams Labs., Inc. v. Garrett (In re Adams Labs.,
Inc.), 3 B.R. 495, 502-03 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980)).
184. Id.
185. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9(b), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 194 (2006).
186. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-253 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
187. Id.
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reasonably discovered the transfer.' 8 In regards to the statute of
limitations, section 9(b) of the UFTA does not offer the same pro-
tection to creditors because it does not account for the situation in
which creditors, through no fault of their own, do not become
aware of the transfer until the statute of limitations has lapsed.'"'
Indeed, if the drafters of the UFTA intended to offer such protec-
tion to creditors bringing a section 5(a) action, they would have
expressly included it in section 9(b) as they did in section 9(a) for
creditors bringing an action under section 4(a)(1)."'9
B. Section 4(a)(2): The UFTA Provision Without a Virginia
Counterpart
The preceding section of this article identified the two primary
Virginia statutes addressing fraudulent transfers and compared
them to their UFTA counterparts. It identified the differences be-
tween the two and demonstrated how those differences may bene-
fit or harm creditors asserting a cause of action pursuant to Vir-
ginia Code section 55-80 or Virginia Code section 55-81. The focus
of this article will now shift to an analysis of a different UFTA
provision-section 4(a)(2). Unlike section 4(a)(1) or section 5(a),
there is no comparable Virginia statute that governs fraudulent
transfers in the same manner as section 4(a)(2). Part III.B(1) of
this article identifies which transfers section 4(a)(2) applies to,
and what a creditor must prove to avoid a given transfer pursu-
ant to that provision. Part III-B(2) compares section 4(a)(2) with
Virginia Code sections 55-80 and 55-81 to determine if the ab-
sence of a section 4(a)(2) counterpart in the Virginia Code gener-
ates any practical differences between Virginia fraudulent trans-
fer law and the UFTA.
188. See id. However, the mere lack of knowledge that the transfer was made without
adequate consideration is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Vashon v. Bar-
rett, 99 Va. 344, 348, 38 S.E. 200, 202 (1901). The lack of knowledge must proceed from
the fraud of the grantee. Id.
189. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9(b), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 194 (2006) (failing to
provide a tolling provision of any kind).
190. For example, section 9(a) allows for a cause of action to be brought after the four-
year period under certain circumstances. Id. § 9(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 194 (2006). It follows
that, if the drafters of the UFTA intended for this additional protection to be available to
creditors asserting a section 5(a) claim, they would have included it in section 9(b). Accord-
ingly, the absence of any such provision in section 9(b) is properly read as an absolute
four-year statute of limitations.
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1. Understanding Section 4(a)(2)
a. Actual Intent to Hinder, Delay, or Defraud Not Required
Section 4(a)(1) and section 4(a)(2) of the UFTA identify two sit-
uations in which "[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim
arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obliga-
tion."19 1 Specifically, a transfer made by a debtor will be fraudu-
lent as to a present or future creditor under section 4(a)(1) "if the
debtor made the transfer . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud" any of his or her creditors.1 92 Similar to section 5(a),
section 4(a)(2) addresses situations in which the debtor makes the
transfer "without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in ex-
change for the transfer or obligation."19 3 However, section 5(a) re-
quires the transfer at issue not be for a reasonably equivalent
value, and that the debtor be insolvent at the time of the transfer
or be rendered insolvent by the transfer.1 9 4 Section 4(a)(2), on the
other hand, does not require the debtor be insolvent at any time
in order for the creditor to sustain her cause of action. 19 5 Rather,
to trigger section 4(a)(2), the alleged fraudulent transfer must
have been for less than a reasonably equivalent value and the
debtor must have either: (a) been engaged or "about to engage in
a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the
debtor were unreasonably small" as they related to the business
or transaction; or (b) "intended to incur, or believed or reasonably
should have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond
his [or her] ability to pay as they became due [as a result of the
transfer]. "1
Before comparing section 4(a)(2) against Virginia's fraudulent
transfer statute and attempting to identify their differences, it is
necessary to perform a comparative analysis of the statutory lan-
guage contained in sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2). Section 4(a)(1), by
191. Id. § 4(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58.
192. Id.
193. Id. § 4(a)(2), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58.
194. Id. § 5(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 129.
195. Id. § 4(a)(2), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58.
196. Id.
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its plain language, applies to any transfer in which a debtor
makes a transfer with the requisite "intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any creditor of the debtor.""' Section 4(a)(2) applies in
situations involving badges of fraud from which a court could in-
fer the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.198 In-
deed, section 4(b)-the provision in the UFTA enumerating the
badges of fraud-recognizes that "[i]n determining actual intent
under subsection (a)(1)," whether "the value of the consideration
received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of
the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred,"
and whether the transfer involved "substantially all the debtor's
assets," are both relevant factors to the issue.19 9
However, reading section 4(a)(2) as reaching transfers in which
the debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creates a statuto-
ry quagmire within the provision. One of the fundamental canons
of statutory interpretation is that "[a] statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant."20 0 If one reads
the situations governed by section 4(a)(2) as ones that necessarily
involve the "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor," section 4(a)(2) becomes a superfluous provision because,
presumably, any transfer involving such intent is already gov-
erned by section 4(a)(1). Therefore, it follows that the UFTA con-
197. Id. § 4(a)(1), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58.
198. Section 4(a)(2) applies to a transfer involving less than reasonably equivalent con-
sideration and one in which the debtor is engaging "in a business or a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the busi-
ness or transaction" or "intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed
that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became due."
Id. § 4(a)(2), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58. These situations strongly resemble badges of fraud. See
Silagy v. Gagnon (In re Gabor), 280 B.R. 149, 158 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) (recognizing
that badges of fraud include a transfer "in the face of actual or threatened litigation
against debtor; at a time of insolvency or other unmanageable indebtedness; in the ab-
sence of fair consideration for the transfer; and to a transferee enjoying a special relation-
ship to the debtor").
199. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58-59 (2006); see also
Walbrun v. Babbitt, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 577 (1872) (holding sale by insolvent retail shop
owner of all of his inventory in a single transaction to be fraudulent); Lumpkins v.
McPhee, 286 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1955) (holding that although a transfer of all assets is said to
indicate fraud, transfer was not fraudulent because full consideration was paid and trans-
feror surrendered possession).
200. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542
U.S. 88, 101 (2004)); see also Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 511
F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 2007) (refusing to apply one statutory provision's definition of a
term to another statutory provision where the former's definition "would render [part of
the latter's] definition superfluous").
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templates that it is at least possible that a transfer involving in-
adequate consideration "for which the remaining assets of the
debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or
transaction," can occur without the "intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud" any of his creditors. This is also true for a debtor engaging
in a business or transaction who "intended to incur, or believed or
reasonably should have believed that he [or she] would incur,
debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became due. "201
One method of reconciling section 4(a)(1) and section 4(a)(2) is
to read a subjective element into section 4(a)(2) that examines
whether the debtor transferor acted with good faith when engag-
ing in a section 4(a)(2) transfer. Such a definition would be simi-
lar to the original Uniform Commercial Code article 9 "honesty in
fact" definition of good faith where, no matter how patently un-
reasonable the act, a transferor acts in good faith so long as she
subjectively believes she is not engaging in conduct that violates
the rights of any creditor.2 0 2 However, it is unlikely the drafters of
the UFTA intended section 4(a)(2) to be applied in this manner.
In discussing the role of good faith in relation to section 4(a)(2),
comment 2 to section 4 explains:
Section 4(a)(2) is derived from §§ 5 and 6 of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act but substitutes "reasonably equivalent value" for
"fair consideration." The transferee's good faith was an element of
"fair consideration" as defined in § 3 of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, and lack of fair consideration was one of the ele-
ments of a fraudulent transfer as defined in four sections of the Uni-
form Act. The transferee's good faith is irrelevant to a determination
of the adequacy of the consideration under this Act .... 203
Thus, although comment 2 does not conclusively rule out the pos-
sibility that the debtor transferor's subjective good faith plays
some role in a section 4(a)(2) transfer analysis, neither the plain
statutory language nor the comments interpreting the provision
indicate that the such good faith is relevant to analyzing a trans-
fer under section 4(a)(1).
201. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
202. U.C.C. § 9-102 (2008); see also Nat'1 Hous. P'ship v. Mun. Capital Appreciation
Partners I, L.P., 935 A.2d 300, 313 (D.C. 2007) (discussing acting in good faith as requir-
ing an individual meet the "honesty in fact" standard).
203. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4 cmt. 2, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 59 (2006).
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The accepted reading of section 4(a)(2) is the exact opposite.
Under this reading, certain transfers are constructively or per se
fraudulent, regardless of the presence or absence of the debtor
transferee's actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
when engaging in the transaction.204 Thus, the creditor would not
need to prove any nefarious intent on the part of the debtor as an
element of his or her prima facie case.20 5 Rather, the creditor
seeking to avoid the transfer would merely need to prove that one
of the situations set out in section 4(a)(2) occurred. Comment 5 to
section 4 bolsters this proposition by noting that "[p]roof of the
presence of certain badges in combination establishes fraud con-
clusively-without regard to the actual intent of the parties-
when they concur as provided in [section] 4(a)(2)."2 06 In other
words, section 4(a)(2) allows for "[a] transfer [to] be set aside as
constructively fraudulent even if the debtor had no actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any existing or future creditor."20 7
b. Section 4(a)(2)(i)'s Unreasonably Small Assets Requirement
Section 4(a)(2)(i) of the UFTA provides that a debtor's transfer
for inadequate consideration is constructively fraudulent if the
debtor "was engaged or about to engage in a business or a trans-
action for which the remaining assets were unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction [at issue]."208 The manner
in which the provision should be applied (hereinafter the "unrea-
sonably small assets" requirement) is the subject of some confu-
sion among the courts.
Some courts view the language of section 4(a)(2)(i) as requiring
the debtor to be engaged in or about to engage in a transaction
204. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the difference be-
tween the UFTA's actual fraud and constructive fraud provisions).
205. Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1499 (11th
Cir. 1997) (stating there is no need to prove fraudulent intent in a constructive fraudulent
transfer action).
206. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4 cmt. 5, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 60 (2006).
207. Edward T. Wahl, Fraudulent Transfers and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
An Overview, 2009 WL 2510912, at *5 (Aug. 2009) (citing Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp.
Ass'n v. Pathways Ctr. for Geriatric Psychiatry, Inc. (In re Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp.
Ass'n), 280 B.R. 400, 409-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002)).
208. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
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that would render it insolvent.2 0 9 Insolvency, as defined by the
UFTA, means "the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of
the debtor's assets at a fair valuation."21 0 This financial condition
is generally known as "balance sheet insolvency."2 11 Other courts
treat the "unreasonably small assets" requirement as different,
although not necessarily exclusive, of insolvency.2 1 2 Under this
latter interpretation of the requirement, "unreasonably small as-
sets" refers to a financial condition short of balance sheet insol-
vency.2 13 Courts applying this standard are concerned with
whether the transfer "left the [d]ebtor with an 'inability to gener-
ate sufficient profits to sustain operations"' or placed the debtor
"on the road to financial ruin."2 1 4 In other words, "the transferor
is technically solvent but doomed to fail."2 15
Of the two views, the latter is the better-reasoned approach to
applying section 4(a)(2). 2 16 To equate the "unreasonably small as-
sets" requirement of the provision to balance sheet insolvency vio-
lates two fundamental canons of statutory interpretation: (a) the
use of different words within the same statute should be read as
having different meanings; and (b) words defined in one part of a
statute are presumed to carry the same definition throughout the
statute.2 17 Insolvency is defined in section 2(a) of the UFTA. 2 18 If
209. See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 577 (M.D. Pa.
1983) (treating the statute's "unreasonably small assets" requirement as requiring proof of
insolvency).
210. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 37 (2006).
211. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (9th ed. 2009).
212. La. Indus. Coatings, Inc. v. Pertuit (In re La. Indus. Coatings, Inc.), 31 B.R. 688,
698 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1983) (noting that insolvency satisfies the "unreasonably small as-
sets requirement," and that a solvent debtor can also be left with "unreasonably small as-
sets" as a result of the transfer).
213. Fid. Bond & Mort. Co. v. Brand (In re Fid. Bond & Mort. Co.), 340 B.R. 266, 294
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).
214. Id. (quoting Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1070 (3d Cir.
1992)); Daley v. Chang (In re Joy Recovery Tech. Corp.), 286 B.R. 54, 76 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
215. MFS/Sun Life Trust-High Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 910 F.
Supp. 913, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
216. See Lee B. Shepard, Beyond Moody: A Re-Examination of Unreasonably Small
Capital, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 906-12 (2006); Bruce A. Markell, Toward True and Plain
Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital, 21 IND.
L. REV. 469, 492 (1988) (equating insolvency with unreasonably small assets "does vio-
lence to the carefully structured standing rules applicable to fraudulent transfers and
achieves results inconsistent with the UFCA's original intent").
217. See, e.g., SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003) ("It is a well-
established canon of statutory interpretation that the use of different words or terms with-
in a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those
words."); Westminster Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 554 S.E.2d 634, 642 (N.C.
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the drafters of the UFTA intended insolvency to be a requirement
under section 4(a)(2)(i), they could have easily included a refer-
ence to "unreasonably small assets" in the section 2 definition of
insolvency, or simply used the term insolvency in lieu of reference
to "unreasonably small assets" in section 4(a)(2)(i). The fact that
they did neither undermines the argument that the "unreasona-
bly small assets" requirement is tantamount to insolvency. 219 This
conclusion is further supported by the fact that the drafters of the
UFTA expressly made insolvency a requirement to avoid a trans-
fer under section 5(a).22 0 If the drafters of the UFTA intended
debtor insolvency to be the requisite financial condition necessary
for a creditor to invoke section 4(a)(2)(i), they would have includ-
ed it as an express requirement of the provision as they did with
section 5(a). 221 The fact that they used different language in sec-
tion 4(a)(2)(i) suggests the two standards are different.2 2 2 Accord-
ingly, this article proceeds under the assumption that the "rea-
sonably small assets" requirement means something different
than balance sheet insolvency.
c. Section 4(a)(2)(ii)'s State of Mind Requirement
If a creditor cannot prove the debtor received inadequate con-
sideration for the transfer at issue in combination with the re-
quirements of section 4(a)(2)(i), the creditor may still avoid the
transfer by proving the debtor received inadequate consideration
for the transfer at issue in combination with the requirements of
section 4(a)(2)(ii). 2 23 Section 4(a)(2)(ii) of the UFTA provides that
a debtor's transfer for inadequate consideration is constructively
fraudulent if the debtor "intended to incur, or believed or reason-
ably should have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts be-
2001) ("[Wlords that carry a specific definition in one part of a statute are presumed to
carry that same definition in all other parts.").
218. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 37 (2006).
219. Salisbury v. Texas Commerce Bank-Houston, N.A. (In re WCC Holding Corp.), 171
B.R. 972, 986 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that the lack of reference to unreasonably
small assets in the definition of insolvency supports the conclusion that the two are not
interchangeable).
220. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 129 (2006).
221. See In re WCC Holding Corp., 171 B.R. at 986 (citations omitted) ("The concept of
unreasonably small assets is separate and distinct from insolvency. If these concepts were
interchangeable, one would expect the [1]egislature to have employed the same lan-
guage.").
222. Id.
223. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(ii), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
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yond his [or her] ability to pay as they became due." 2 24 Before
comparing section 4(a)(2)(ii) to Virginia Code sections 55-80 and
55-81, it is important to distinguish how, if at all, the situation
contemplated by section 4(a)(2)(ii) is different than insolvency
and what transfers the provision purports to avoid.
It is tempting to read section 4(a)(2)(ii) as referring to insolven-
cy, given that courts in the past have used the term "equitable in-
solvency" to refer to the financial condition in which the debtor is
unable to pay debts as they mature (hereinafter, this article will
use the term "equitable insolvency" in this context).2 2 5 This temp-
tation is only strengthened by the fact that, in referring to insol-
vency, other statutory bodies define insolvency in accordance with
equitable insolvency.2 2 6 The UFTA, however, uses the term insol-
vency to refer to a very narrow and specific financial condition.
Anywhere the terms "insolvent" or "insolvency" appear in the
UFTA, they should be read as referring to balance sheet insolven-
cy (where the debtor's liabilities exceed her assets). They should
not be read to include equitable insolvency (the inability to pay
debts as they become due). Such a conclusion is warranted be-
cause the UFTA does not incorporate the concept of equitable in-
solvency into its definition of "insolvent."2 7 The fact that the
UFTA contemplates use of the term insolvency in the context of
balance sheet insolvency 2 8 weighs against the conclusion that
section 4(a)(2)(ii) is meant to be interpreted as referencing insol-
vency. Another factor weighing against such a reading is that to
read the relevant language-"to incur, or believed or reasonably
should have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond
his [or her] ability to pay as they became due"-as being tanta-
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Larrimer v. Feeney, 192 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1963) (discussing the mean-
ing of insolvency in the context of equity and in the context of bankruptcy).
226. Ametek, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp. (In re Storage Tech. Corp.), 48 B.R. 862,
864 (Bank. D. Colo. 1985) (noting the Uniform Commercial Code uses insolvency in the
context of equitable insolvency).
227. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 37 (2006). However,
it is worth noting that section 2(b) creates a rebuttable presumption of insolvency if a
debtor "is generally not paying his [or her] debts as they become due." Id. § 2(a) cmt. 2, 7A
pt. 2 U.L.A. 38.
228. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Napoleon, 701 N.E.2d 350, 354 n.4 (Mass. 1998)
("Though the general test for insolvency under the UFTA is balance sheet insolvency, the
UFTA borrows, as a presumption, this test for involuntary adjudication under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Under the UFTA a debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they be-
come due is presumed insolvent.").
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mount to insolvency renders section 4(a)(2)(ii) meaningless.
Transfers made for inadequate consideration while the debtor is
insolvent or that render the debtor insolvent are governed by sec-
tion 5(a), and reading section 4(a)(2)(ii) as also referencing insol-
vency would mean that it governs the same transfers as section
5(a)-those made for inadequate consideration and that result in
the debtor becoming insolvent.
Accordingly, there are at least two possible ways to read sec-
tion 4(a)(2)(ii) in relation to the UFTA's definition of insolvency:
(a) section 4(a)(2)(ii) reaches those situations where the debtor is
equitably insolvent but not balance sheet insolvent; or (b) section
4(a)(2)(ii) shifts the focus of the court's inquiry from the financial
condition of the debtor to the debtor's state of mind at the time
the debtor engaged in the transaction. The sections below discuss
each of these potential readings.
The first possible reading of section 4(a)(2)(ii) is that it is
meant to enable creditors to avoid transfers that left the debtor
balance sheet solvent but nevertheless rendered the debtor "equi-
tably insolvent."2 2 9 However, this interpretation is problematic for
several reasons. As noted above, section 2(b) creates a rebuttable
presumption of balance sheet insolvency when the debtor is equi-
tably insolvent.2 3 0 Recall that under section 5(a), a transfer made
for inadequate consideration while the debtor is insolvent or that
renders the debtor insolvent can be avoided by present credi-
tors.23 1 Section 2(b) enables a creditor to create a presumption of
insolvency by demonstrating the debtor is not paying debts as
they become due and, accordingly, provides an alternate method
for creditors to carry their burden and prove the insolvency ele-
ment of section 5(a).2 32 In this regard, however, the drafters of the
UFTA contemplated that the debtor or other proponent of a given
transfer could overcome this presumption and defend the trans-
fer's validity by showing the debtor to be balance sheet solvent
229. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Danis Indus. Corp., No. 3:00CV256, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14045, at *96 n.53 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2009) (equating the language of section
4(a)(2)(ii) with insolvency).
230. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2 cmt. 2, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 37 (2006).
231. See Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Overall, 53 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Mo. App.
2001).
232. 1992 Republican Senate-House Dinner Comm. v. Carolina's Pride Seafood, Inc.,
858 F. Supp. 243, 249-50 (D.D.C. 1994).
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even though the debtor failed to pay the debts as they became
due. 233
It seems illogical that a debtor's failure to pay her debts as they
become due creates a rebuttable presumption of section 5(a)'s in-
solvency element, yet equitable insolvency in itself serves as a
"substitute" for section 4(a)(2)(ii)'s insolvency element, when the
only other difference between the two provisions is that section
4(a)(2)(ii) is available to future creditors and section 5(a) is not.23 4
In other words, section 2(b)'s presumption of insolvency becomes
meaningless because any creditor relying on the presumption to
prove section 5(a)'s insolvency requirement could simply use the
same fact of the debtor not paying debts as they become due to
avoid the transfer under section 4(a)(2)(ii). Thus, a creditor would
be ill-advised to ever make use of section 5(a) when section
4(a)(2)(ii) would allow the creditor to establish its case in a man-
ner that would not allow the proponent of the transfer to rebut
the presumption establishing one element of the creditor's claim
by use of the same facts. Additionally, such a reading blurs the
distinction between sections 4(a)(2)(i) and 4(a)(2)(ii) because there
seems to be little difference between a transfer leading to equita-
ble insolvency and a transfer leading to a debtor being left with
unreasonably small assets.2 35 Accordingly, this reading of the
statute should be rejected.
The second possible reading of section 4(a)(2)(ii) is that the
provision is concerned with the debtor's subjective intent when
she made the transfer for inadequate consideration, not the debt-
or's financial condition.2 3 6 A careful reading of section 4(a)(2)(ii)
reveals that the statute does not require the transfer actually
cause the debtor to incur "debts beyond his or her ability to pay
as they became due."23 7 Rather, the provision only requires the
debtor "intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that [she] would incur, debts beyond [her] ability to pay
233. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2 cmt. 2, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 37 (2006).
234. Compare id. § 4(a)(2)(ii), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58, with id. § 5(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 129.
235. Fid. Bond & Mort. Co v. Brand (In re Fid. Bond & Mort. Co.), 340 B.R. 266, 294
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (explaining that the unreasonably small assets requirement of section
4(a)(2)(i) refers to the situation where a debtor has insufficient profits to sustain its opera-
tions).
236. Villaje Del Rio, Ltd. v. Colina Del Rio, L.P., No. SA-07-CA-947-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist.
47714, at *14 n.18 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2009) (explaining that section 4(a)(2)(ii) does not
necessarily require a showing of insolvency).
237. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(ii), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
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as they became due."2 38 In other words, a creditor attempting to
avoid a transfer pursuant to section 4(a)(2)(ii) must establish that
a debtor engaged in a transfer in which he intended, believed or
reasonably should have believed would result in an accumulation
of debt beyond that which he could honor.2 39 Section 4(a)(2)(ii)
does not require that the debtor's transfer actually result in equi-
table insolvency (although proving equitable insolvency would be
relevant to proving the debtor's state of mind when engaging in
the transfer).2 4 0 If the creditor's burden under section 4(a)(2)(ii) is
perceived in this manner, it follows that the creditor can meet the
burden by satisfying either a subjective test (the "intended" and
"believed" language) or an objective test (the "reasonably should
have believed" language).2 4 1
Understanding section 4(a)(2)(ii) as being concerned with the
debtor's intent as opposed to the debtor's financial condition is the
better-reasoned approach because: (a) such an interpretation
draws a clear line between section 4(a)(2)(i) transfers and section
4(a)(2)(ii) transfers; (b) such an interpretation draws a clear line
between section 5(a) transfers and section 4(a)(2)(ii) transfers; (c)
such an interpretation gives section 2(b)'s rebuttable presumption
of insolvency substantive value as opposed to rendering it mean-
ingless; and (d) such an interpretation offers greater protection to
creditors in that they need not wait until the debtor is in financial
ruin to have sufficient evidence to avoid a fraudulent transfer
made for less than valuable consideration and that significantly
increases the debtor's financial liabilities.
Despite the many reasons supporting reading section 4(a)(2)(ii)
as being concerned with the debtor's intent, this reading also car-
ries its inconsistency issue. Namely, section 4(a)(1) governs trans-
fers made by a debtor "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud any creditor."24 2 Section 4(a)(2)(ii) governs transfers by a
debtor "intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that it would incur, debts beyond [the debtor's] ability to
238. Id. (emphasis added).
239. See id.
240. See id.; see also CB Richard Ellis Inc. v. CLGP, L.L.C., No. 09CA1368, 2010 Colo.
App. LEXIS 1050, at *20-21 (July 22, 2010) (explaining section 4(a)(2)(ii) requires the
court to inquire into the debtor's state of mind).
241. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., Colo. App. LEXIS 1050, at *21-22; see also UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(ii), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
242. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
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pay as they became due."2 43 In order for the latter not to be ren-
dered superfluous by the former, one must operate under the as-
sumption that there is some difference between the two. 244 One
difference is that section 4(a)(1) requires a creditor to establish
"actual intent," whereas section 4(a)(2)(ii) enables a creditor to
prevail by reference to an objective test-a reasonable debtor
would have believed the transfer would create debts exhausting
the debtor's financial resources. 24 5 For the subjective test in sec-
tion 4(a)(2)(ii) to have any substantive value, however, the debtor
intending or believing that a transfer would cause it to "incur
debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due" must in some
way be categorically different than the debtor intending to "to
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor."24 6 Otherwise,
the two provisions operate to address the exact same situation
and one becomes unnecessary in light of the other.2 4 7
The resolution to this issue is found in understanding that
while there may be some overlap in the sense that some transfers
could likely be avoided under either provision, the substantive
difference between the statutes is how each provision allows a
creditor to prove its case. More often than not, creditors establish
fraudulent intent by proving that any given combination of badg-
es of fraud accompanied the transfer, allowing the court to infer
the presence of actual intent.2 4 8
Thus, if one conceptualizes the creditor's section 4(a)(1) burden
of proof in a formulaic sense, it could be depicted in the following
manner: any badge of fraud + any badge of fraud + any badge of
fraud = potentially sufficient evidence to establish actual intent.2 49
Notice that the requirements for proving the desired conclusion
are not defined and the outcome is not certain.2 5 0 However, if one
243. Id. § 4(a)(2)(ii), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58.
244. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
245. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4(a)(1) & (a)(2)(ii), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58
(2006); CB Richard Ellis Inc., 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS 1050, at *22.
246. Compare UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006),
with id. § 4(a)(2)(ii), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58.
247. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Morgan Marshall Indus., 662 N.E.2d 595, 601 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996).
249. See id. at 602 ("[W]hen these 'badges of fraud' are present in sufficient number,
this may give rise to an inference or presumption of fraud.").
250. "There is no minimum number of factors that must be present before the scales tip
in favor of finding of actual intent to defraud. This list of factors is meant to provide guid-
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conceptualizes the creditor's burden of proof under section
4(a)(2)(ii) in a formulaic sense, it could be depicted in the follow-
ing manner: specific badge of fraud (transfer for less than reason-
ably equivalent value) + specific badge of fraud (intent to incur
debts beyond debtor's capability) = constructive fraud. Notice now
the elements are specifically defined and the outcome is certain.
Thus, while some transfers could very well be avoided under both
provisions, section 4(a)(2)(ii) offers a creditor an alternate frame-
work for a creditor to conclusively prove its case when specific
badges of fraud are present. Accordingly, when a creditor can
show inadequate consideration for a transfer and the debtor's in-
tent or belief that the transfer would result in excessive debt, the
creditor can avoid the risk of the fact finder not inferring the ac-
tual intent of the debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by
bringing a cause of action under section 4(a)(2)(ii).
2. UFTA Section 4(a)(2) and Virginia Code Section 55-80
In theory, section 4(a)(2) provides greater protection for credi-
tors than section 55-80. This is because section 4(a)(2) lessens the
creditor's burden of proof in specific situations, so the creditor
does not have to prove the debtor possessed actual fraudulent in-
tent. Rather, the creditor merely needs to prove that certain
badges of fraud were concurrently present surrounding the trans-
fer to conclusively establish fraud.2 5 1 In other words, the primary
advantage section 4(a)(2) offers to creditors, that Virginia Code
section 55-80 does not, is that section 4(a)(2) eliminates the need
for the court (or finder of fact) to infer fraudulent intent on part of
the debtor from circumstantial evidence when specific badges of
fraud are present. As shown below, the implications of this bene-
fit extend beyond theory and can offer practical value to creditors.
The practical value offered by section 4(a)(2) is illustrated by
the case of Catron v. Bostic."' Bostic involved creditors of a dece-
dent attempting to avoid the decedent's purchase of his brother's
farm as a fraudulent transfer.2 5 3 Prior to his death, the decedent's
ance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way or the other." Filip v. Bucurenciu, 28
Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 890 (Ct. App. 2005).
251. See text accompanying note 195.
252. Catron v. Bostic, 123 Va. 355, 96 S.E. 845 (1918).
253. Id. at 364-65, 96 S.E. at 848.
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brother was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.2 5 4 In antici
pation of a corresponding civil suit for wrongful death, the broth-
er negotiated the sale of his 160 acre farm to the decedent for
$6000-a price well beyond the value of the land."' The decedent
paid $2000 of the purchase price in cash and issued four $1000
negotiable notes in his brother's name for the remainder of the
price.2 5 6 The brother endorsed and transferred the notes to his
wife without consideration.2 5 7 The decedent's brother and his wife
then jointly conveyed the notes to an individual named Catron in
exchange for $3200.258 After the decedent's death, the administra-
tor of his estate sold all of the assets of his mercantile business
and included the proceeds of those assets in the estate.2 5 9 Catron
alleged he was a bona fide creditor of the decedent and brought
suit, seeking payment on the notes.26 0
The administrator and the decedent's creditors objected to
payment of the notes on the ground that the underlying sale be-
tween the decedent and his brother was voidable as a fraudulent
transfer.2 6 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia held the transfers
could not be avoided by the creditors because, while the record es-
tablished that the decedent intended to defraud his brother's
creditors when he purchased the farm, there was no evidence in
the record that the decedent specifically intended to defraud his
own creditors or the creditors of his business when he purchased
the farm. 2 62 Accordingly, even though the decedent made a "bad
bargain and agreed to pay more for the land than it is worth" to
the detriment of his creditors, the absence of specific intent on
part of the decedent prevented the creditors from avoiding the
transfer under Virginia's fraudulent transfer statute.263
Analyzing Bostic under section 4(a)(2) illustrates why not hav-
ing to demonstrate the intent of the debtor is beneficial for credi-
254. Id. at 364, 96 S.E. at 848.
255. Id. at 365, 96 S.E. at 848.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 363, 96 S.E. at 847.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 363, 365-66, 96 S.E. at 847, 848.
262. Id. at 368-69, 96 S.E. at 849.
263. Id. at 368, 96 S.E. at 849.
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tors.26 4 As noted above, avoidable transfers under section 4(a)(2)
include transfers made: (a) without receipt of a reasonably equiv-
alent value in exchange; and (b) when the debtor was engaged or
about to engage in a transaction for which the remaining assets of
the debtor were unreasonably small; or intended, believed, or rea-
sonably should have been believed to incur debts beyond its abil-
ity to pay as those debts came due.16 ' The facts of Bostic indicate
that the decedent did not receive reasonably equivalent value
when he bought the farm from his brother.2 6 6 Although the opin-
ion is not clear on the value of the farm at the time of the trans-
fer, it is clear that the sale price did not result from arms-length
negotiation, the decedent made a "bad bargain" and paid too
much for the farm, and the sale acted to the detriment of the de-
cedent's other creditors."' Moreover, the facts indicate that the
decedent should have reasonably believed that he would not have
been able to pay the debts as they became due after the trans-
fer.268 The transfer took place in November of 1913 and the dece-
dent passed away in March of 1914.269 At the time of his death,
the decedent owned some real estate and personal property val-
ued at $25.270 He was, however, "considerably indebted," and even
his personal stocks were encumbered as collateral for the notes he
issued in the purchase of his brother's farm.2 71
Yet, despite these facts, the court found the record did not sup-
port a finding that the decedent intended to defraud his creditors
by purchasing the farm.2 72 Thus, those creditors could not avoid
the sale.2 7 3 It is possible, for the reasons identified above, that a
court considering the same facts would have reached a different
264. See, e.g., Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1499
(11th Cir. 1997) (stating there is no need to prove fraudulent intent in a constructive
fraudulent transfer action if the debtor meets certain statutory factors).
265. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
266. Bostic, 123 Va. at 369, 96 S.E. at 849.
267. Id. at 367, 369, 96 S.E. at 848, 849. The opinion does not provide a clear value for
the farm at the time of the purchase. There was, however, some evidence that the dece-
dent took out a mortgage on the farm for $2000 after purchasing it. Id. at 366, 96 S.E. at
848. Although it is unclear if the mortgage represents the value of the land at that time, it
is evidence that supports the inference that the debtor may have overpaid for the farm by
as much 200% its value.
268. See id. at 358, 364-65, 96 S.E. at 846, 848.
269. Id. at 365, 96 S.E. at 848.
270. Id. at 358, 96 S.E. at 846.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 369, 96 S.E. at 849.
273. Id.
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conclusion by applying section 4(a)(2) because the decedent's lack
of fraudulent intent in purchasing the farm would no longer be
relevant in the analysis. 274 Rather, the court's analysis would end
once it determined: (a) the decedent received less than a reasona-
bly equivalent value in the exchange; and (b) the decedent be-
lieved or should have reasonably believed he would not be able to
pay his debts when they became due. 27 5 The joint presence of
those badges of fraud would conclusively establish the sale of the
farm as fraudulent under section 4(a)(2).2 76
3. UFTA Section 4(a)(2) and Virginia Code Section 55-81
Section 4(a)(2) is similar to Virginia Code section 55-81 in that
neither statute requires the creditor challenging the transfer to
prove the debtor actually intended to hinder, delay, or defraud its
creditors when it engaged in the transfer. Section 4(a)(2), howev-
er, offers additional protections to creditors not offered by Virgin-
ia Code section 55-81. Those additional protections are: (a) the
statute requires the debtor receive "reasonably equivalent value"
in the exchange; (b) the statute may be asserted by both present
and future creditors; and (c) the statute does not require the
debtor be insolvent at any time to avoid the transfer. 277 The im-
plications of the first benefit have already been identified in Part
II.A(2), because the exact same benefit is available to creditors
under section 5(a)(1). Accordingly, this section of the article by-
passes analysis of the first benefit available to creditors bringing
an action pursuant to section 4(a)(2) instead of Virginia Code sec-
tion 55-81, and focuses on the second and third benefits.2 7 8
The second benefit section 4(a)(2) affords creditors, as com-
pared to Virginia Code section 55-81, is availability to a broader
range of creditors. Virginia Code section 55-81 enables debtors
that existed at the time of the allegedly fraudulent transfer to at-
274. See Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1499 (11th
Cir. 1997) (stating there is no need to prove fraudulent intent in a constructive fraudulent
transfer action).
275. Id.
276. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4 cmt. 5, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 60 (2006) ("Proof of
the presence of certain badges in combination establishes fraud conclusively-i.e., without
regard to the actual intent of the parties-when they concur as in § 4(a)(2) .
277. See id. § 4(a)(2), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58.
278. For a discussion of how a different "reasonably equivalent value" consideration
standard or benefits creditors, see Part II(A)(2).
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tempt to avoid the transfer as a violation of the provision. 27 9 The
statute, however, specifically notes that a transfer that would be
fraudulent to existing creditors under its terms "shall not, for
that cause, be decreed to be void as to subsequent creditors or
purchasers.""" Such a limitation is not present in section 4(a)(2).
Rather, the statute plainly allows any creditor to seek a cause of
action under it, "whether the creditor's claim arose before or after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred."281' Accord-
ingly, future creditors of a debtor who made a transfer for inade-
quate consideration are able to avoid transfers under section
4(a)(2) that could have been reached under Virginia Code section
55-81 because of the statutory language limiting its availability to
present creditors.
The final and most significant benefit creditors obtain from sec-
tion 4(a)(2) that is not available under Virginia Code section 55-
81 is that creditors asserting a cause of action under section
4(a)(2) need not prove the insolvency of the debtor to prevail.28
Conversely, to prevail on a cause of action brought under Virginia
Code section 55-81, the creditor must demonstrate the debtor was
insolvent at the time of the transfer or that the debtor became in-
solvent as a result of the transfer.2 8 3 In lieu of demonstrating the
debtor's insolvency at the time of the transfer or as a result of the
transfer, section 4(a)(2) enables the creditor to avoid the transfer
by showing the debtor received inadequate consideration and ei-
ther: (a) engaged or was about to engage in a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small; or (b) intended, believed, or reasonably should have be-
lieved, that it would incur debts beyond its ability to pay as those
debts came due.2 8 4 Each of these alternatives to insolvency ena-
279. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
280. Id.
281. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006).
282. Villaje Del Rio, Ltd. v. Colina Del Rio, L.P., No. SA-07-CA-947-XR, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47714, at *14 n.18 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2009) (explaining that section 4(a)(2) does
not necessarily require a showing of insolvency).
283. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
284. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2), 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 58 (2006). Note, how-
ever, that the creditor would need to establish one of these scenarios in conjunction with
inadequate consideration, just as a creditor would need to show insolvency in conjunction
with inadequate consideration under Virginia Code section 55-81.
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bles a creditor to avoid certain transfers the creditor would not be
able to avoid if relying on Virginia Code section 55-81. The specif-
ics of their application are discussed below.
Section 4(a)(2)(i) protects creditors beyond Virginia Code sec-
tion 55-81 by enabling them to avoid transfers that involved a
significant amount of the debtor's assets for inadequate consider-
ation, but after which the debtor remains balance sheet solvent. 28 5
However, the practical value of this added protection appears to
be fairly limited. It is uncommon to find a case in which a court
finds a debtor clearly solvent before or following a transfer that
left the debtor with unreasonably small assets.2 86 Accordingly, it
would be inaccurate to perceive section 4(a)(2)(i) as creating relief
for an entire class of creditors not accounted for by Virginia Code
section 55-81. Rather, the benefit section 4(a)(2)(i) provides over
Virginia Code section 55-81 is much narrower in that the issue of
insolvency is no longer dispositive to the outcome of the case.
Thus, as a practical matter, creditors receive a limited benefit
from section 4(a)(2)(i) that they do not receive from Virginia Code
section 55-81 in cases where the solvency status of the debtor at
the time of the transfer is questionable. 28 7 A creditor bringing a
Virginia Code section 55-81 action in such a case would need to
carry its burden of proving the insolvency of the debtor by clear
and convincing evidence.2 88 A creditor bringing the same under
section 4(a)(2)(i), however, would be able to focus less on the in-
solvency issue and direct the court to the poor financial condition
of the debtor following the transfer.2 8 9 Indeed, contrary to a credi-
285. See MFS/Sun Life High-Trust Yield Series v. Van Dusen Airport Servs. Co., 910 F.
Supp. 913, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted).
286. Although rare, there are some cases that generate such a fact pattern. See, e.g.,
Daly v. Fusco (In re All-Type Printing, Inc.), 274 B.R. 316, 321 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002)
(finding the debtor clearly balance sheet solvent but nonetheless operating with unreason-
ably small capital).
287. See, e.g., Devon Mobile Commc'ns Liquidation Trust v. Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.
(In re Adelphia Commc'n Corp.), No. 04-03192, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4600, at *12 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006) (explaining that even if the debtor manages to show solvency, the
creditor can prevail on a section 4(a)(2)(i) cause of action); Ferrari v. Barclays Bus. Credit,
Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 148 B.R. 97, 132-33 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (declining to
make a finding as to solvency but still finding transfer left debtor with unreasonably small
assets).
288. Noramco Intern. v. Charlie's Pizza, Ltd., 55 Va. Cir. 47, 47 (2001) (Fairfax County)
(stating the burden for Virginia Code sections 55-80 and 55-81 is clear and convincing evi-
dence).
289. See, e.g., Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply,
Inc.), 100 B.R. 127, 139 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (explaining that, while the solvency status
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tor bringing an action pursuant to section 55-81, a creditor at-
tempting to avoid a transfer pursuant to section 4(a)(2)(i) need
only show the "transaction leaves a [debtor] with unreasonably
small capital [by] creat[ing] an unreasonable risk of insolvency,
not necessarily a likelihood of insolvency."29 0
Section 4(a)(2)(ii) offers protection to creditors beyond Virginia
Code section 55-81 in that it enables creditors to avoid transfers
made by a solvent debtor for inadequate consideration if the court
determines the debtor had the requisite intent at the time of the
transfer. Under this provision, the creditor need not prove the
debtor actually intended to hinder, delay, or defraud its credi-
tors.2 9 1 Rather the creditor must prove the debtor "intended to in-
cur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that [it] would
incur, debts beyond [its] ability to pay as they came due [as a re-
sult of the transfer]."292 The creditor can meet this burden by
showing the debtor subjectively believed at the time of the trans-
fer that "its subsequent creditors would be injured, [meaning]
that the debtor would be unable to pay such debts as they ma-
tured."2 9 3 Conversely, the creditor can also meet this burden by
use of an objective test and showing the debtor should have rea-
sonably believed at the time of the transfer that the transfer
would "incur, debts beyond [its] ability to pay as they became
due."2 94 The primary advantage a creditor realizes under section
4(a)(2)(ii) that it does not have under Virginia Code section 55-80
is that section 4(a)(2)(ii) enables the court to look at the debtor's
state of mind at the time of the transfer as opposed to the debtor's
financial condition.
of the debtor at the time of the transfer was questionable, the transfer at issue clearly left
the debtor with unreasonably small capital).
290. Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 302 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1997) (emphasis added).
291. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. CLGP, L.L.C., No. 09CA1368, 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS
1050, at *20-21 (July 22, 2010).
292. Id. at *20 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-8-105(b)(II) (2010)).
293. ASARCO L.L.C. v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 399 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)
(quoting Yoder v. T.E.L. Leasing, Inc. (In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.), 124 B.R. 984,
994 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)).
294. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS 1050, at *20.
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For a creditor to prevail under Virginia Code section 55-81, the
debtor must be insolvent before engaging in the transfer or be
rendered insolvent by the transfer.2 9 5 To make this determina-
tion, the court looks to the debtor's financial condition as of the
date of the transfer and, if the creditor has not proven the debtor
was insolvent on that date, the creditor's claim under section 55-
81 will fail.2 9 6 Under section 4(a)(2)(ii), however, the intent to ac-
cumulate debts beyond the debtor's ability must be present at the
time of the transfer, but not the actual financial condition itself.2 97
Thus, instead of taking a snapshot of the debtor's financial condi-
tion at the time of the transfer and evaluating whether a debtor's
liabilities exceeded its assets or whether the debtor could imme-
diately pay his or her debts in full, the court will examine the
debtor's projected income as of the time of the transfer and when
various debts would become due.2 98 If, based on that evidence, the
court can infer the debtor either intended, believed, or should
have believed that the transfer would incur debt beyond her abil-
ity to pay when those debts became due, the creditor will have
provided sufficient evidence to avoid the transfer.2 99
As with section 4(a)(2)(i), however, the practical implications of
the provision are fairly limited. The situation in which a debtor is
found to be balance sheet solvent (thus placing it outside the
reach of Virginia section 55-81), but where the debtor is found to
have engaged in a constructively fraudulent transfer under sec-
tion 4(a)(2)(i) is rare. Indeed, the most common situation in which
section 4(a)(2)(ii) applies are cases in which the court finds the
creditor has sufficiently proven the debtor was both insolvent at
the time of the transfer and engaged in the transfer with the in-
tent to incur debts that the debtor could not pay when they be-
295. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. P.R.T. Enters., Inc., 65 Va. Cir. 271, 277 (2004) (Nor-
folk City).
296. Gold v. Laines (In re Laines), 352 B.R. 397, 402 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (stat-
ing that Virginia Code section 55-81 requires the debtor to be insolvent as of the date of
the transfer for the transfer to be avoidable); Va. Dep't of Taxation v. Nicolet, 62 Va. Cir.
372, 373 (2003) (Richmond City) (explaining that Virginia Code section 55-81 could not be
sustained because the Commonwealth did not prove the debtor's insolvency as of the date
of the transfer at issue).
297. See CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS 1050, at *20-22.
298. See id.
299. Id. at *20.
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came due.3 00 Section 4(a)(2)(ii) provides some additional protec-
tion to creditors beyond Virginia Code section 55-81 in the situa-
tion where the debtor is balance sheet solvent but is shown
through circumstantial evidence to have engaged in a transfer
with the intent to incur more debts than it can honor. The rarity
in which a distinction is drawn between the two types of financial
conditions, however, undermines the importance of the provision.
Moreover, the practical significance of section 4(a)(2)(ii) as
weighed against Virginia Code section 55-81 is further under-
mined by the reality that the evidence used to prove intent to in-
cur debt beyond what the debtor could pay is often the same type
of evidence relied on by creditors to prove a debtor's actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.3 0 1 Thus, even in the situa-
tion where the debtor is balance sheet solvent but circumstantial
evidence exists that the debtor engaged in a transfer with the in-
tent to incur more debts than the debtor could honor, a creditor
could still make a colorable claim to avoid the transfer pursuant
to Virginia Code section 55-80. Accordingly, section 4(a)(2)(ii)
adds little, if anything, to Virginia's current body of fraudulent
transfer law.
IV. CONCLUsIoN
Because of its significant place in both state and federal litiga-
tion, the UFTA currently provides courts with the clearest and
most developed principles for resolving fraudulent transfer dis-
putes. It is the law governing fraudulent transfers in the majority
of U.S. jurisdictions.3 0 2 Moreover, the drafters of the UFTA specif-
ically designed it to meld with the Bankruptcy Code.30 3 Even
within the UFTA, however, there are still unsettled issues and
conflicting interpretations of its provisions.0 4
300. See, e.g., IGF Ins. Co. v. Cont'1 Cas. Co., No. 1:01-cv-799-RLY-KPF, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96714, at *54 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2009); ASARCO L.L.C. v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396
B.R. 278, 377-78 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008).
301. In Virginia, the badges of fraud consist of: "(1) the relationship of the parties; (2)
the grantor's insolvency; (3) pursuit of the grantor by creditors; (4) want of consideration;
(5) retention of possession of the transferred property by the grantor; (6) incurring debt
fraudulently after the transfer." Dollar v. Dollar, 27 Va. Cir. 474, 475 (1983) (Frederick
County).
302. See UFTA Legislative Fact Sheet, supra note 8.
303. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4-7, prefatory note (2006).
304. See supra Part II.A-B.
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Virginia's body of fraudulent transfer law, in contrast, consists
of a small number of statutes.0 5 Unlike the UFTA, which defines
its terms in other internal statutes, Virginia's statutory terms are
defined predominantly through case law. Even within Virginia's
small statutory framework, however, there remain valid ques-
tions about the proper application of the statutes. 30 6 These areas
of uncertainty-in both the UFTA and Virginia's fraudulent
transfer statutes-simultaneously provide flexibility for attorneys
to be creative in their litigation strategies and pitfalls for attor-
neys attempting to advise clients on the potential avoidability of a
given transfer.
In the preceding sections, this article provided an analysis of
various UFTA provisions in comparison with Virginia fraudulent
transfer statutes. Although the statutes in Virginia remain large-
ly unchanged from their roots in the 1800s, they generally ad-
dress the same transfers addressed by the UFTA. The UFTA,
however, provides some additional protection to creditors by in-
cluding provisions that seemingly address certain types of trans-
fers on which the Virginia statutes remain silent. Admittedly,
some of these provisions appear to have more practical value than
others when critically examined against the Virginia statutes.
Regardless, it makes sense for Virginia to adopt the UFTA for at
least three reasons. First, a more developed body of statutory
fraudulent transfer law gives lawyers greater ability to identify
fraudulent transfers prospectively (thus, protecting their clients'
interests). Second, adopting the UFTA would better sync Virginia
fraudulent transfer law with the Bankruptcy Code, thus offering
greater predictability in bankruptcy litigation. Finally, adopting
the UFTA would give Virginia a more developed body of fraudu-
lent transfer law, thereby furthering the underlying purpose of
all fraudulent transfer law-to prevent debtors from depriving
their creditors of those assets to which creditors are rightfully en-
titled.
Accordingly, the General Assembly should once again consider
a bill that would adopt the UFTA and repeal Virginia's current
fraudulent transfer statutes. At a minimum, doing so would af-
ford the General Assembly an opportunity to thoroughly examine
whether Virginia's fraudulent transfer laws are sufficiently pro-
305. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-80, -81, -82, -82.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011).
306. See supra Part II.A-B.
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tecting creditors in the modern commercial marketplace. Given
that the question never reached a final resolution in the past, it
seems wholly appropriate to revisit the issue presently, especially
when viewed in light of Virginia's growing fraudulent transfer lit-
igation and projected economic difficulties. It may very well be
that Virginia does not need the UFTA because Virginia Code sec-
tions 55-80 and 55-81 already accomplish much of what the
UFTA would do. However, knowing with certainty the truth of
such a statement is sufficiently important to warrant more atten-
tion than the authors can provide in an article. It is one that
should be considered, debated, and ultimately resolved by the pol-
icymakers of the commonwealth.
$$
